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RAPE ON AND OFF CAMPUS
Deborah Tuerkheimer∗
The need for institutional reform to address the problem of sexual assault,
particularly on college campuses, is widely acknowledged. Unnoticed,
however, is a profound disconnect between cultural norms around sex and the
legal definition of rape. The Model Penal Code and a majority of states still
retain a force requirement, effectively consigning most rape—that is, nonstranger rape—to a place beyond law’s reach. Of special concern, the
dominant statutory approach misconceives or overlooks entirely the role of
consent, which has become central to popular and political discourses around
sexual assault. In the midst of increasing moves on campus to codify
affirmative consent standards (“yes means yes”), rape law remains mired in
an archaic view of consent as rather beside the point. This Article recasts the
significance of law’s preoccupation with force by introducing a taxonomy of
cases in which force and non-consent tend to diverge. The no-force/no-consent
cases raise a question critical to ongoing reform efforts: does the absence of
consent make sex rape? Outside of law, this inquiry has for the most part been
resolved; what remains is to reconcile competing interpretations of consent’s
meaning. In stark contrast, the criminal justice system’s treatment of nonstranger rape reflects a doctrine woefully out of step with modern conceptions
of sex. Sexual agency provides the theoretical underpinning needed to close
this gap.

∗ Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. J.D., Yale Law School; A.B., Harvard
College. For comments on earlier drafts, I am grateful to Susan Frelich Appleton, Cynthia Grant Bowman,
Joshua Fischman, Andrew Gold, Andrew Koppelman, and Meredith Martin Rountree. For sharing insights that
bear directly on this project, I thank participants in the Sexualities Project at Northwestern reading group, and
the Panel on Comparative Gender at the 2014 Law and Society Annual Meeting. I am indebted to Laura
Rosenbury and Marc Spindelman for conversations that continue to influence my ideas about rape law.
Elisabeth Nolte provided excellent research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
Rape has moved to the forefront of our collective consciousness. One
striking feature of this new visibility is the centrality of non-stranger rape—the
kind of rape that is most ubiquitous and, for most of our history, has remained
most hidden.1 Today, it is acquaintance rape that is in the zeitgeist;2 no longer
does the weapon-wielding stranger dominate television portrayals,3 captivate
the news media,4 or saturate political discourse.5 These developments both
reflect and shape an emerging consensus: when it comes to rape, the most
pervasive danger is different from what once was most feared and the problem
is more widespread than ever perceived.
The emergence of non-stranger rape as an issue of national importance has
generated a range of critiques, focused particularly on the military, on college
campuses, and on a “rape culture” that surrounds and sustains faulty
institutional responses. Largely absent from these conversations, however, is
the substantive criminal law. To be sure, commentators subject the decision-

1

For a seminal treatment, see SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE (1987).
As one recent commentary observed, “Rape is everywhere today.” What Rape Culture? A
Conversation with Kate Harding and Anne K. Ream, NEWCITY (June 19, 2014), http://newcity.com/2014/06/
19/what-rape-culture-a-conversation-with-kate-harding-and-anne-k-ream/.
3 Non-stranger rape has been featured on a number of television blockbusters, including Mad Men,
Girls, House of Cards, and Downton Abbey. See Amanda Hess, Was That a Rape Scene in Girls?, SLATE:
XXFACTOR
(Mar.
11,
2013,
4:19
PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2013/03/11/
girls_adam_and_natalia_sexual_assault_and_verbal_consent_on_hbo_s_girls.html; David Itzkoff, Watching
‘Downton Abbey’: A Shocking Crime, N.Y. TIMES: ARTSBEAT (Jan. 12, 2014, 10:00 PM),
http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/01/12/watching-downton-abbey-a-shocking-crime/; Emily Nussbaum,
Nussbaum on ‘Mad Men’: How Joan’s Rape Changed Everything, VULTURE (Oct. 24, 2008),
http://www.vulture.com/2008/10/nussbaum_on_mad_men_why_joans.html; Kelsea Stahler, ‘House of Cards’
Season 2 Tackles Rape Like No Other Thriller Has, BUSTLE (Feb. 14, 2014),
http://www.bustle.com/articles/15595-house-of-cards-season-2-tackles-rape-scene-like-no-other-thriller-has.
4 In just this past year, high profile media coverage of non-stranger rape, especially on campus, has been
extensive. For a few of many, many examples, see Alan Blinder & Richard Perez-Peña, Vanderbilt Rape Trial
Didn’t Stir Vanderbilt, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2015, at A14; Walt Bogdanich, Reporting Rape, and Wishing She
Hadn’t, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2014, at A1; Eliza Gray, Sexual Assault on Campus, TIME, May 26, 2014, at 20;
James Hamblin, How Not to Talk About the Culture of Sexual Assault, ATLANTIC (Mar. 29, 2014), http://
www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/03/how-not-to-talk-about-the-culture-of-sexual-assault/359845/.
5 In the political realm, reform efforts have focused on sexual assault in the military and sexual assault
on campus (still ongoing). For an overview of the former, see Helene Cooper, Pentagon Study Finds 50%
Increase in Reports of Military Sexual Assaults, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2014, at A14; Helene Cooper, Senate
Rejects Blocking Military Commanders from Sexual Assault Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2014, at A11. For a
discussion of evolving political responses to the campus sexual assault crisis, see infra notes 53–55 and
accompanying text.
2
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making of police and prosecutors to scrutiny, and rightly so.6 But, for the most
part, ongoing efforts to address rape have ignored the criminal statutes that
define rape.
This neglect is troubling. In many areas, rape law is in desperate need of
modernization,7 and a failure to notice its retrograde features virtually
guarantees their endurance. This Article focuses on one such feature—the
ambiguous doctrinal treatment of sexual consent. As we will see, in most
jurisdictions a statutory force requirement displaces the question of consent.8 It
is surprising, then, that the issue still tends to surface throughout the case law.
When defendants appeal their convictions on grounds that the proof of force
was inadequate, courts not only tend to agree, but to remark—gratuitously—on
the likelihood that the victim actually consented to the intercourse. To reach
this conclusion, courts often deploy retrograde notions of consensual sex and
female sexuality. Lacking an applicable statutory definition of consent, rape
law enables judicial imaginings that are incompatible with prevailing
understandings.9 This failing is especially striking when juxtaposed with the
notable turn, of late, toward a culture of consent.10 Until rape statutes are
reformed to reflect this cultural shift, judicial perspectives on consent will
remain unmoored from legislative guidance and immune from review.
Part I describes this revolution by examining the contemporary campus
rape crisis. In this context, consent occupies a critical place in ongoing
discussions of both the problem and its solution. Indeed, it is virtually
axiomatic that nonconsensual sex is rape; the challenge outstanding is to define
consent. On this score, college disciplinary codes seem to be converging on a
standard that requires an affirmative expression of some sort, verbal or
6 See, e.g., Tyler Kingkade, Prosecutors Rarely Bring Charges in College Rape Cases, HUFFINGTON
POST (June 17, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/17/college-rape-prosecutors-press-charges_
n_5500432.html; Amanda Marcotte, Why Not Just Turn Campus Rape Allegations Over to the Police?
Because the Police Don’t Investigate, SLATE: XXFACTOR (Sept. 15, 2014, 1:51 PM), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/xx_factor/2014/09/15/new_york_times_on_the_laughable_tallahassee_police_response_to_sexual_assau
lt.html. See generally Kimberly A. Lonsway & Joanne Archambault, The “Justice Gap” for Sexual Assault
Cases: Future Directions for Research and Reform, 18 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 145 (2012) (documenting
the attrition of rape allegations as cases progress through the criminal justice system).
7 See, e.g., Deborah Tuerkheimer, Judging Sex, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1461 (2012) (critiquing outdated
views of normative female sexuality as reflected in the evidentiary doctrine of the rape shield).
8 On the quantum of force recognized as legally sufficient, see infra note 80 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 41–56 and accompanying text.
10 “A consent culture is one in which the prevailing narrative of sex is centered around mutual consent.”
M_Wanderers, Post to Consent Culture, URBAN DICTIONARY (Feb. 17, 2014), http://www.urbandictionary.
com/define.php?term=consent%20culture (last visited July 25, 2015).
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nonverbal.11 Although this standard is not without its detractors,12 the starting
point for debate is that non-consent—as opposed to force—defines rape.
Against this backdrop, the Model Penal Code and many state statutes—about
half—continue to insist otherwise.13 In these jurisdictions, absent force, sex
without consent does not qualify as rape. The treatment of this common fact
pattern reflects a profound gap between the criminal law and widely shared
social norms.
Part II develops a new perspective on the criminal law’s consent problem.
It does so by analytically isolating a set of cases that might fairly be said,
notwithstanding the governing legal framework, to involve rape without
force—that is, sex without consent. These cases involve the operation of what I
will call “functional force”—recurring dynamics that obviate the need for
abundant physical force to accomplish nonconsensual intercourse. This
taxonomy of functional force includes three categories: sleep,14 intoxication,15
and relational control.16 In each of these categories, the absence of consent
(which I will sometimes refer to as non-consent) is the salient feature; yet rape
law renders non-consent largely irrelevant. Where consent appears at all, it is
conceived in startlingly archaic ways.
The disconnect between criminal definitions of rape and university
definitions of rape has emerged without discussion.17 The analysis that follows
begins to fill this void.18 I argue that a fundamental divide between the
11 See Jake New, The “Yes Means Yes” World, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.
insidehighered.com/news/2014/10/17/colleges-across-country-adopting-affirmative-consent-sexual-assaultpolicies (reporting that 800 colleges have adopted standards of affirmative consent). I will argue that, because
it fetishizes force, the criminal law—which one might view as a natural source of workable definitions of
consent—cannot guide efforts in this regard.
12 See infra notes 58–65 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 71–76 and accompanying text.
14 See infra Part II.A.
15 See infra Part II.B.
16 See infra Part II.C.
17 What has been noticed is the far more limited set of procedural protections afforded those accused of
sexual assault in college disciplinary proceedings (as compared to protections afforded criminal defendants).
See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet et al., Opinion, Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct.
15,
2014,
https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/10/14/rethink-harvard-sexual-harassmentpolicy/HFDDiZN7nU2UwuUuWMnqbM/story.html (detailing the objections of dozens of members of
Harvard’s law faculty to new rules governing sexual assault; to date, these rules do not include an affirmative
consent standard). Although the procedural deficiencies of college disciplinary processes are outside the scope
of this discussion, it is worth noting the importance of both appropriate substantive standards of conduct and
adequate procedures for implementing these standards.
18 I first identified this divide in a public “debate” over policy responses to campus rape. Deborah
Tuerkheimer, Improving the Criminal System’s Response Would Cut Campus Rape, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12,
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treatment of rape on and off campus has consequences that reverberate across
domains.
Part III discusses why dueling definitions of rape on and off campus are of
concern. Overall, this division raises the specter of campus rape as a subcriminal offense, one located mainly outside the bounds of our criminal justice
system—a reality not lost on victims of campus rape, the vast majority of
whom choose not to involve the police.19 But the burdens of a quasi-criminal
approach to rape are not distributed equally. Rather, the discrepancy between
competing rape definitions functions to discount the non-forcible sexual
violations of women (and men) who are not presently attending college—as it
happens, women who are even more vulnerable to these violations than their
undergraduate counterparts.20 For victims living in jurisdictions that maintain a
force requirement, unless they attend college, there is no resort to an alternate
(albeit sub-criminal) definition of rape as sex without consent.21 This prospect
raises a global critique: insistence that force is the defining feature of rape
affords relatively less legal protection to women who lack privileged collegiate
status. To help remedy this breach, this Article offers a theory of why—
regardless of status—sexual consent matters.
In conclusion, I urge the renovation of rape law.22 Efforts to end sexual
assault, on and off campus, cannot succeed unless consent culture migrates to
criminal justice.23
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/12/12/justice-and-fairness-in-campus-rape-cases/
improving-the-criminal-systems-response-would-cut-campus-rapes.
19 See SOFI SINOZICH & LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, RAPE AND
SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMIZATION AMONG COLLEGE-AGE FEMALES, 1995–2013, at 1 (Jill Thomas & Lynne
McConnell, eds., Dec. 2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsavcaf9513.pdf (finding that 80% of sexual
assaults on campus were not reported to police); see also Kimberly Hefling, Justice Department: Majority of
Campus Sexual Assault Goes Unreported to Police, PBS NEWSHOUR (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/
newshour/rundown/four-five-acts-campus-sexual-assault-go-unreported-police/ (explaining the massive
underreporting of campus rape as significantly attributable to the fact that victims “know in our society that the
only rapes that are taken seriously are those committed by strangers and are significantly violent”); infra notes
244–46 and accompanying text.
20 See SINOZICH & LANGTON, supra note 19, at 4 (finding that women aged eighteen to twenty-four who
were not college students were 1.2 times more likely to be sexually assaulted than women in the same age
bracket who attended college; and that non-students experienced approximately twice the number of sexual
assaults as their student counterparts).
21 See infra text following notes 240–48.
22 See infra notes 263–70 and accompanying text.
23 Decades ago, Lynne Henderson succinctly observed that “[law and culture] reciprocally influence
understandings of what is and is not the crime of rape.” Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 LAW &
PHIL. 127, 132 (1992). For more general thoughts on the law’s relationship to social norms, see Dan M.
Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997); Lawrence Lessig, The
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I. THE CONSENT REVOLUTION
Consent is widely understood as the governing principle in matters of sex.
Although the concept is not novel, its visibility and importance are new. These
days, sexual consent is prominently featured in mainstream and social media.24
Consent animates social movements;25 it even enters political discourse.26 The
meaning of consent remains contested—a subject to which we will return.27
Still, more than ever, consent is on the collective mind.
The rise of consent as a construct of paramount significance is especially
evident in the college setting. This development has been propelled by the
campus rape crisis.28 Of late, unprecedented attention has been given to the
stunning incidence of sexual assault during the undergraduate years—up to one
in five women, according to the much-debated federal figure.29 At the same
time, due in no small part to the activism of college rape victims,30 it has
Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943 (1995); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive
Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996).
24 See, e.g., Tara Culp-Ressler, What ‘Affirmative Consent’ Actually Means, THINKPROGRESS (June 25,
2014),
http://thinkprogress.org/health/2014/06/25/3453041/affirmative-consent-really-means/;
Natalie
Kitroeff, Making Consent Cool: Students Advocate for Consensual Sex, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2014, at ED16;
Abby Young-Powell, Do Students Need Classes on Sexual Consent?, GUARDIAN (June 5, 2014),
http://www.theguardian.com/education/2014/jun/05/sexual-consent-classes-for-university-students.
25 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, SlutWalking in the Shadow of the Law, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1453, 1475–78
(2014) (describing why sexual consent emerged as the “touchstone” of an international anti-rape movement).
26 See infra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 58–65 and accompanying text.
28 For an overview, see Michelle Goldberg, Why the Campus Rape Crisis Confounds Colleges, NATION
(June 5, 2014), http://www.thenation.com/article/180114/why-campus-rape-crisis-confounds-colleges.
29 SEXUAL VIOLENCE: FACTS AT A GLANCE, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (2012),
http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/sv-datasheet-a.pdf. The accuracy of the 18% figure has been
attacked based on limitations of the data set and on studies suggesting that women are raped on campus with
far less frequency. For a useful explanation of discrepancies in the research, see Dana Goldstein, The Dueling
Data on Campus Rape, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 11, 2014), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2014/12/11/
the-dueling-data-on-campus-rape. The prevalence of sexual violence against undergraduate men, as compared
to women, is even less understood. See U.S. SENATE SUBCOMM. ON FIN. & CONTRACTING OVERSIGHT, SEXUAL
VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS 2 (July 9, 2014) [hereinafter SEXUAL VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS], http://www.mccaskill.
senate.gov/SurveyReportwithAppendix.pdf.
30 “It seems as though each day, there is another survivor coming forward with a story about the crime
against them being treated with either incompetence or indifference by a university.” Olivia Nuzzi, Campus
Sex Assault Law Could Be ‘Two Years’ Away, DAILY BEAST (July 3, 2014, 5:45 AM), http://www.
thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/07/03/campus-sex-assault-law-could-be-two-years-away.html. For recent
accounts of survivors who publicly described their experience of rape and condemned a failed college
response, see, for example, Bogdanich, supra note 4; Anonymous, Dear Harvard: You Win, HARV. CRIMSON
(Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2014/3/31/Harvard-sexual-assault/; Emma Bogler,
Frustrated by Columbia’s Inaction, Student Reports Sexual Assault to Police, COLUM. DAILY SPECTATOR
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become uncontroversial to proclaim that universities are not responding
effectively to the problem.31
This massive institutional breakdown encompasses many components,
including failure to encourage reporting; failure to provide adequate training to
faculty, staff, and investigators; failure to provide adequate services for
survivors; failure to coordinate with the efforts of law enforcement; and failure
to comply with the requirements and best practices for adjudicating
allegations.32 For present purposes, however, one deficit is most relevant: until
recently, most college disciplinary codes did not define sexual consent. This
omission became glaring—so much so that, last summer, the Department of
Education proposed a rule requiring all institutions of higher education to
include a definition of consent in their codes.33
Without a doubt, the nationwide response to sexual assault is on the
precipice of change. Three features of the discourse around campus rape are
telling. First, reformers begin from the proposition that sex without consent is
rape, regardless of the quantity of force used to accomplish it.34 Second, an
increasingly mainstream conception of consent requires an affirmative
expression of one’s will; on this view, passivity (in its extreme incarnation,
unconsciousness) does not signify consent to intercourse. Finally, efforts to
lend content to the notion of affirmative consent are proceeding without
(May 16, 2014, 5:05 PM), http://columbiaspectator.com/news/2014/05/16/frustrated-columbias-inactionstudent-reports-sexual-assault-police. See also Jake New, Major Sexual Assault Settlement, INSIDE HIGHER ED
(July 21, 2014), http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/07/21/u-connecticut-pay-13-million-settle-sexualassault-lawsuit#sthash.DYYNvyyU.dpbs (reporting that the University of Connecticut agreed to pay nearly
$1.3 million to settle a federal lawsuit alleging the mishandling of students’ sexual assault complaints).
31 The Department of Education is currently investigating ninety-five colleges and universities for
possible Title IX violations. Tara Culp-Ressler, These Are the Colleges and Universities Now Under Federal
Investigation for Botching Rape Cases, THINKPROGRESS (Jan. 13, 2015, 9:00 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/
health/2015/01/13/3610865/title-ix-investigations/. As conservative commentator Ross Douthat has observed,
“In the debate over sexual violence on college campuses, two things are reasonably clear. First, campus rape is
a grave, persistent problem, shadowing rowdy state schools and cozy liberal-arts campuses alike. Second,
nobody—neither anti-rape activists, nor their critics, nor the administrators caught in between—seems to have
a clear and compelling idea of what to do about it.” Ross Douthat, Opinion, Stopping Campus Rape, N.Y.
TIMES, June 29, 2014, at SR11.
32 These deficiencies were specifically cited and discussed in Senator McCaskill’s Report. SEXUAL
VIOLENCE ON CAMPUS, supra note 29.
33 Violence Against Women Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 35418 (proposed June 20, 2014). To read the final version
of the rule, see Violence Against Women Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 62752 (proposed Oct. 20, 2014) (codified at 34
C.F.R. pt. 668).
34 Many colleges now use the term “nonconsensual sex” instead of rape. Claire Gordon, ‘Nonconsensual
Sex’: How Colleges Rebranded Rape, AL JAZEERA AM. (Apr. 17, 2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/
watch/shows/america-tonight/articles/2014/4/17/nonconsensual-sexwhenrapeisreworded.html.
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engaging the law of rape, which is relatively un-evolved. I discuss these
observations in turn.
A. Consent Culture
Last spring, the White House produced a one-minute public service
announcement devoted to non-stranger rape—rape “on college campuses, at
bars, at parties, even in high schools.”35 The video features President Obama
and Vice Present Biden, along with superstars Daniel Craig, Benicio del Toro,
Dulé Hill, Seth Meyers, and Steve Carell. At the outset, del Toro declares, “if
she doesn’t consent, or if she can’t consent, it’s rape.” The rest of the spot
functions as a call to action: speak up, help her, do not blame her, do not be a
part of the problem, be a part of the solution.36
When it was released, the public service announcement received a good
deal of notice and its message generated no real dispute.37 Notably, the basic
admonition—without consent, sex is rape—prompted no dissension. By
considering the PSA and the response it did not provoke, one can discern what
might be described as an increasingly settled cultural consensus: consent is
now generally viewed as the essence of lawful sex.
This cultural consensus has—again, without notice—framed the policy
discourse around campus rape. For instance, in April 2014, the First Report of
the White House Task Force to Protect Students From Sexual Assault
reiterated: “[I]f she doesn’t consent—or can’t consent—it’s a crime.”38 The

35 The White House, 1 is 2 Many PSA: 60 Second, YOUTUBE (Apr. 29, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=xLdElcv5qqc.
36 The role of bystander intervention in preventing campus rape has become a topic of considerable
discussion. See Nancy Cohen, Training Men and Women on Campus to ‘Speak Up’ to Prevent Rape, NPR
(Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/04/30/308058438/training-men-and-women-on-campus-to-speakup-to-prevent-rape.
37 See, e.g., Gael Fashingbauer Cooper, Biden, Obama Join Hollywood Stars in Anti-Rape PSA, TODAY
(Apr. 30 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.today.com/entertainment/biden-obama-join-hollywood-stars-anti-rapepsa-2D79601776; Amanda Hess, Daniel Craig, Steve Carrell, and Seth Meyers Would Like You to End Rape,
Please, SLATE: XXFACTOR (Apr. 30, 2014, 11:16 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2014/04/30/
obama_anti_rape_psa_daniel_craig_steve_carell_seth_meyers_and_benicio_del.html; Alexandra Petri, The
White House’s New PSA Against Rape is a Good Start, WASH. POST: COMPOST (May 1, 2014), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/blogs/compost/wp/2014/05/01/the-white-houses-new-psa-against-rape-is-a-good-start/;
Marisa Taylor, PSA Tells Men on College Campuses to Step in and Stop Rape, AL JAZEERA AM. (April 30,
2014), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/4/30/college-sexual-assaultpsabidenwhitehouse.html.
38 WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT, NOT ALONE: THE FIRST
REPORT OF THE WHITE HOUSE TASK FORCE TO PROTECT STUDENTS FROM SEXUAL ASSAULT 2 (Apr. 2014)
[hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT], http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/report_0.pdf; see also
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White House Checklist for Sexual Misconduct Policies recommended that
schools “clearly define all conduct prohibited,” as well as consent itself.39
Efforts to combat rape on campus manifest widespread agreement that, as a
normative proposition, sex must be consensual.40 Conversely, sex without
consent is considered rape. In the course of reshaping the institutional response
to sexual assault, this much has become apparent: The necessity of consent is
the premise that frames the discussion.
B. Consent as Affirmative
As consent has ascended in importance, social and institutional definitions
of its meaning are shifting. While by no means universally shared, an
understanding of consent as affirmative is becoming commonplace on
campuses.41 As one commentator recently remarked, “from coast to coast,
colleges are rethinking how they define consent on their campuses.”42
WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON WOMEN AND GIRLS, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: A RENEWED CALL TO ACTION
(Jan. 2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/sexual_assault_report_1-21-14.pdf.
39 See Checklist for Campus Sexual Misconduct Policies 4, NOT ALONE, https://www.notalone.gov/
assets/checklist-for-campus-sexual-misconduct-policies.pdf.
40 See Rebecca Nagle, Five Great College Campaigns Promoting Consent, BITCH MEDIA (Oct. 9, 2013,
9:33 AM), http://bitchmagazine.org/post/five-great-college-campaigns-promoting-consent (discussing ways
that college students are “fighting rape culture on their campuses” with “consensual-sex promoting actions”).
41 See New, supra note 11 (reporting that 800 colleges have adopted standards of affirmative consent). A
number of prominent feminist writers have expressed support for affirmative consent standards. See, e.g.,
Amanda Hess, “No Means No” Isn’t Enough. We Need Affirmative Consent Laws to Curb Sexual Assault,
SLATE: XXFACTOR (June 16, 2014, 2:13 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2014/06/16/
affirmative_consent_california_weighs_a_bill_that_would_move_the_sexual.html (“Having sex with a person
who is lying limply on a bed is not consensual, unless that person happens to be really, really into that—but
that’s a situation that requires a conversation, not an assumption.”); Amanda Marcotte, Can Affirmative
Consent Standards Fix the Problem of Alcohol and Rape?, SLATE: XXFACTOR (Feb. 18, 2014, 12:57 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2014/02/18/alcohol_and_rape_it_s_time_to_embrace_affirmative_conse
nt_standards.html (“[It is] important, then, to support the push for states and universities and other institutions
to create an affirmative consent standard, where both parties should display a ‘demonstrated intent to have sex’
in order for it to be considered consent.”).
Some feminists have also noted that “affirmative consent” standards, which represent an improvement,
may still fail to account for female sexual agency. See, e.g., Maya Dusenbery, “Affirmative Consent” Just
Means Mutual Desire. And It Should Definitely Be the Standard, FEMINISTING, http://feministing.com/2014/
06/25/affirmative-consent-just-means-mutual-desire-and-it-should-definitely-be-the-standard/ (last visited July
25, 2015). This perspective has been articulated as follows:
Frankly, sometimes I think we should ditch the term “consent” altogether. It feels like a
carryover from the old male-aggressor/female-gatekeeper model of (hetero) sex, and, even with
the addition of adjectives like “affirmative” or “enthusiastic,” retains this contractual
connotation that, I think, detracts from the shift we’re actually trying to make here. The point is
that people shouldn’t be “consenting” to sex as if they’re acquiescing to a request to borrow
your damn toothbrush.
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One indication of this movement’s mainstream appeal is the recent passage
of a California law requiring all institutions of higher education to incorporate
affirmative consent definitions into their disciplinary codes.43 According to the
groundbreaking legislation,
“Affirmative consent” means affirmative, conscious, and voluntary
agreement to engage in sexual activity. It is the responsibility of each
person involved in the sexual activity to ensure that he or she has the
affirmative consent of the other or others to engage in the sexual
activity. Lack of protest or resistance does not mean consent, nor
does silence mean consent. Affirmative consent must be ongoing
throughout a sexual activity and can be revoked at any time. The
existence of a dating relationship between the persons involved, or
the fact of past sexual relations between them, should never by itself
be assumed to be an indicator of consent.44

Although California was the first state to mandate a “yes means yes”
standard for all institutions of higher education,45 universities around the nation
were already moving in this direction.46 For instance, Yale’s definition of
consent requires “positive, unambiguous, voluntary agreement at every point
Id.

42

New, supra note 11.
Ian Lovett, California Bill Focuses on Curbing Campus Sexual Assaults, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2014,
at A16. The law has unsurprisingly encountered many of the criticisms generally aimed at efforts to define
affirmative consent. Some objections relate to the involvement of the state. See, e.g., Editorial, Sex and
College Students: Should the Legislature Be in the Mix Too?, L.A. TIMES (May 28, 2014, 4:25 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-affirmative-consent-20140525-story.html (“A state law is not
the way to convey messages better imparted by experts. It’s one thing for the government to say what people
may not do, but it’s more worrisome when politicians tell us what we must do.”). Still other areas of
disagreement concern the contents of affirmative consent rules. See infra notes 58–65 and accompanying text.
At times, the critique has distorted the proposed legislation. See Tracy Clark-Flory, The Media Slams a Bill for
Banning Foreplay on College Campuses—Except Everything They’re Writing Is a Lie, SALON (June 5, 2014,
6:59
PM),
http://www.salon.com/2014/06/05/the_media_slams_a_bill_for_banning_foreplay_on_
college_campuses_except_everything_theyre_writing_is_a_lie/.
44 2014 Cal. Stat. ch. 748 (S.B. No. 967).
45 Other states are already following suit. In New York, Governor Andrew Cuomo is spearheading
legislative efforts to require all universities and colleges to adopt an affirmative consent definition. E.g.,
Amanda Marcotte, Andrew Cuomo Proposes Affirmative Consent for New York Universities, SLATE:
XXFACTOR (Jan. 19, 2015, 9:11 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/xx_factor/2015/01/19/affirmative_
consent_in_new_york_gov_andrew_cuomo_proposes_legislation.html. Other states, including New Jersey and
New Hampshire, are considering passage of similar laws. E.g., New, supra note 11.
46 See New, supra note 11 (reporting that 800 colleges have adopted standards of affirmative consent).
Colleges in the University of California system already had a similar standard in place when the law was
enacted defining consent as “an affirmative, unambiguous and conscious decision by each participant to
engage in mutually agreed upon sexual activity.” Sexual Violence Prevention & Response: Education &
Training, U.C., BERKELEY, http://survivorsupport.berkeley.edu/sexual-assault-facts (last visited July 25,
2015).
43
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during a sexual encounter—the presence of an unequivocal ‘yes’ (verbal or
otherwise), not just the absence of a ‘no.’”47 At the University of Iowa,
“consent must be freely and affirmatively communicated between both
partners in order to participate in sexual activity or behavior. It can be
expressed either by words or clear, unambiguous actions . . . . Silence, lack of
protest, or no resistance does not mean consent.”48 At schools that have not yet
incorporated a rule of affirmative consent, students are pressuring
administrators to do so.49 For example, staffers at the Harvard Crimson (the
daily newspaper) recently endorsed language that would require a
“demonstrated intent to have sex from both parties,” adding that this change is
“number one on [the] list of demands” of a campus group aimed at
“dismantling rape culture.”50 Each month, it seems, more colleges amend their
disciplinary codes to reflect this imperative.51
Affirmative consent’s mainstream status is also evidenced—and no doubt
bolstered—by the Obama Administration’s recent involvement in the problem
of campus rape. According to the Sexual Assault Task Force, consent must be
affirmative; “[s]ilence or absence of resistance does not imply consent.”52
Given recent interventions by the White House,53 the Department of
Education,54 and Congress55 to spur campus reform, we should expect to see
47 Tara Culp-Ressler, Yale University Works to Strengthen Its Sexual Assault Policy by Clarifying
‘Consent’, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 13, 2013, 9:07 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/health/2013/09/13/2616531/
yale-university-consent/.
48 Affirmative Consent Is Sexy: University of Iowa Policy Summary, UNIV. OF IOWA, http://dos.uiowa.
edu/assistance/consent/.
49 Alongside this effort is activism aimed directly at college cultural norms. See Kitroeff, supra note 24.
50 See, e.g., Editorial, Fixing Sexual Assault Response, HARV. CRIMSON (Apr. 7, 2014) (citing Deborah
Tuerkheimer, Opinion, We Preach ‘No Means No’ for Sex, But That’s Not What The Law Says, GUARDIAN
(Jan. 12, 2014, 8:30 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/12/rape-definition-use-offorce), http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2014/4/7/fixing-sexual-assault-response/; Our Demands, OUR
HARV. CAN DO BETTER, https://ourharvardcandobetter.wordpress.com/our-demands/ (last visited July 25,
2015).
51 New, supra note 11.
52 Sample Language and Definitions of Prohibited Conduct for a School’s Sexual Misconduct Policy 4,
NOT ALONE, https://www.notalone.gov/assets/definitions-of-prohibited-conduct.pdf.
53 See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text.
54 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
55 See Jennifer Steinhauer, Proposed Bill Targets Assaults On Campus, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2014, at
A14. According to Senator McCaskill, a sponsor of the proposed legislation, “[T]he bipartisan Campus
Accountability and Safety Act will create incentives for schools to take proactive steps to protect their students
and rid their campuses of sexual predators.” See Press Release, U.S. Senator Claire McCaskill, The Bipartisan
Campus
Accountability
and
Safety
Act
1,
http://www.mccaskill.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
CampusAccountabilityAndSafetyAct.pdf (last visited July 26, 2015). The bill is designed in part to address the
problem of confusion regarding “acceptable standards of conduct and definitions of rape and sexual assault.”
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growing uniformity in the definition of consent across disciplinary codes, with
an emphasis on its affirmative qualities. But it is unlikely that this equilibrium
will be achieved without a struggle.
C. Consent on the Ground
A workable definition of affirmative consent is elusive.56 Americans rarely
talk about what consent looks like, and a conception of passive sexuality—
particularly passive female sexuality—persists.57 Many who support
affirmative consent in the abstract balk at incorporating this norm into a
binding rule. Three separate but related concerns animate the opposition to
codifying affirmative consent.
One preoccupation stems from the claimed impossibility of interpreting a
party’s signals in a sexual encounter, a situation that is presented as hopelessly
confusing and ambiguous.58 Among those who reject this characterization,
many nevertheless concede the difficulty of specifying with precision what
constitutes adequate consent.59
A second and related group of criticisms center on the “unsexiness” of
affirmative consent rules and how they will detract from the spontaneity of

Press Release, U.S. Senator Claire McCaskill, Bipartisan Bill Takes Aim at Sexual Assault on College and
University Campuses (July 30, 2014), http://www.mccaskill.senate.gov/media-center/news-releases/campusaccountability-and-safety-act.
56 A rich body of scholarship considers the ontology of consent from both legal and philosophical
perspectives. See, e.g., Robin West, Sex, Law, and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 221, 224 (Franklin G. Miller & Allan Wertheimer eds., 2010). Although theories of consent are
largely outside the scope of this discussion, it is worth noting that affirmative consent rules tend to reflect a
performative (as opposed to a subjective) orientation. See ALAN WERTHEIMER, CONSENT TO SEXUAL
RELATIONS 145–47 (2003) (describing different philosophical approaches to defining consent).
57 This point is referenced obliquely in a video that educates University of California, Berkeley students
about the impact of intoxication on consent. In the video, trainers urge students to “think[ ] about sex as
something that you do with someone, versus to someone.” See University Health Services-Tang Center,
EmpowerU: Let’s Talk About Consent, YOUTUBE (Feb. 20, 2014) (emphasis added), https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=dV_Tp8eO9YE.
58 See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 43 (worrying that the bill’s language seems “vague—what exactly
would constitute an unambiguous sign of consent?”); Emma Woolf, Does California’s College Rape Bill Go
Too Far in Regulating Sex?, DAILY BEAST (June 23, 2014, 5:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2014/06/23/does-california-s-college-rape-bill-go-too-far-in-regulating-sex.html (“[R]esolving whether
‘affirmative consent’ was not only present but ‘continuous’ throughout an act will be nearly impossible.”).
59 See, e.g., Hess, supra note 41 (“It’s a bit ironic that the lawmakers behind the California bill seem
more comfortable specifying what constitutes rape than actually describing what clear, unambiguous,
enthusiastic consensual sex looks like. I suppose that’s because consensual sex is intimate and fraught; like
obscenity, you kind of know it when you see it.”).
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sexual encounters at a substantial cost,60 whether this cost is framed in terms of
diminished sexual pleasure,61 or the greater awkwardness that will result from
communication around sex.62
Last, some critics of affirmative consent rules are troubled by the prospect
of penalizing men who fail to conform their sexual practices to an idealized
vision, given how dramatically this vision is said to depart from reality.63 From
this perspective, what are billed as “gray zone” cases should not be defined as
rape unless and until sexual norms shift.64 A stronger form of this objection
despairs that all or most sex would count as rape if an affirmative consent
requirement were to be adopted.65
My purpose in cataloguing these objections is not to answer them here,66
but to observe that, while the content of an affirmative consent rule is
60 One commentator suggested that California lawmakers “want sex to be as spontaneous as doing your
taxes,” and criticized the bill as “the sort of law that is designed to suck everything joyous, spontaneous,
creative, intimate and beautiful out of human existence.” In short, lamented this critic, “for normal people, it’s
a buzz kill to say the least.” Tad Cronn, California Proposes a License to Breed, POL. OUTCAST (June 5,
2014), http://politicaloutcast.com/2014/06/california-proposes-license-breed/#YSP0Yg5OwTFVDsRU.99 (last
visited July 26, 2015).
61 See Steve Straub, California Liberals Pass Bill to Regulate Sex; Requires Specific Verbal or Written
Consent, FEDERALIST PAPERS PROJECT, www.thefederalistpapers.org/education-2/california-liberals-pass-billto-regulate-sex-requires-specific-verbal-or-written-consent (last visited June 23, 2015) (worrying that sex “that
occurs during the ‘heat of the moment’ would be outlawed” by the California affirmative consent law); Cathy
Young, California’s Absurd Intervention over Dorm Room Sex, REASON (June 22, 2014), http://reason.com/
archives/2014/06/22/californias-absurd-intervention-over-dor (criticizing requirement of affirmative consent
because “[w]hether anyone could feel ‘sexy’ under such conditions seems dubious at best”).
62 See Kitroeff, supra note 24 (observing, without endorsing the perspective, that “[t]oday, as it was
decades ago, the butt of the joke is the awkward formality of the ask”); Young, supra note 61 (citing the
“common view that such negotiations [around affirmative consent] are awkward moment-ruiners”).
63 One commentator has suggested, “the fact that many people seem to feel like [an affirmative consent
requirement] marks such a radical departure from our current approach to sex reveals the depths of rape culture
more than all the stats on sexual assault, in my opinion.” Dusenbery, supra note 41.
64 With respect to this concern, the specific language used to describe affirmative consent is critical.
Cf. Young, supra note 61 (approving changes to the bill that removed “the warning against relying on
nonverbal communication and the admonishment to stop for a safety check if any ambiguity seems to arise”).
65 See, e.g., David Bernstein, YOU Are a Rapist; Yes YOU!, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 23, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/23/you-are-a-rapist-yes-you/ (warning
that some definitions “make[] almost every adult in the U.S. (men AND women)—and that likely includes
you, dear reader—a perpetrator of sexual assault”); Woolf, supra note 58 (discussing critics that caution the
affirmative consent law would “make most ordinary couples potentially liable for sex offenses”).
66 Many commentators have roundly rejected the idea that a cultural shift toward requiring affirmative
consent is unduly onerous. For example, Amanda Taub has observed:

From the perspective of actually trying to have a genuinely consensual sex life, there’s
nothing particularly burdensome here. Don’t take advantage of someone else’s inebriation. Hold
out for enthusiasm instead of resignation. You don’t need to be a rocket scientist in order to have
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vigorously contested, the criminal law is altogether missing from the
interpretative debate. This absence merits attention. One might think of the law
of rape—or, more precisely, rape statutes that define what is prohibited—as a
source of workable consent definitions, or at least a jumping off point.67 In
fact, quite the opposite is true.
There are a few notable exceptions. For instance, California defines consent
as “positive cooperation . . . pursuant to an exercise of free will. . . . freely and
voluntarily” given.”68 Similarly, Wisconsin’s consent definition requires
“words or overt actions . . . indicating freely given agreement.”69 But for the
most part, as we will see, the criminal law lags far behind settled
understandings of rape.70 Campus rape reform cannot draw upon the law of
rape because the law of rape is almost entirely disconnected from the culture of
consent.

a conversation in advance about boundaries or to agree on a safe word. And if your partner sends
signals that confuse you, stop. What you lose in nights of passion, you will gain in nights of not
being a rapist.
Amanda Taub, “Yes Means Yes” Is About Much More than Rape, VOX (Oct. 13, 2014, 3:00 PM),
http://www.vox.com/2014/10/10/6952227/rape-culture-is-a-tax-on-women-CA-yes-means-yes-dierks-katz. As
Amanda Taub has further argued:
The [California] law didn’t come out of nowhere. It emerged as a response to a status quo that
has proved to be an all-too-powerful tool for sexual predators, because it enables them to claim to
see consent in everything except continuous, unequivocal rejection. That status quo puts women
in the position of having to constantly police their own behavior to make sure that they are not
giving the appearance of passive consent. That’s not only exhausting; it’s limiting. It reinforces
power imbalances that keep women out of positions of success and authority.
Id.

67 The available sanctions for a violation obviously differ dramatically from the campus disciplinary
context to the criminal justice system, which presumably accounts for the operation of divergent standards of
proof and disparate procedural safeguards.
68 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West Supp. 2015).
69 See WIS. STAT. § 940.225(4) (2014); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.010(7) (West 2009)
(defining “consent” to mean that “at the time of the act of sexual intercourse there are actual words or conduct
indicating freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse”).
70 To emphasize an earlier point, even vociferous critics of affirmative consent standards view sex
without consent as rape. See, e.g., Young, supra note 61 (“To say that sex without consent is rape is to state the
obvious.”).
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II. CRIMINAL LAW’S CONSENT PROBLEM
Even today, a majority of jurisdictions rely on the concept of force in
defining rape.71 State statutory schemes are more varied than ever,72 meaning
that cross-jurisdictional comparisons are necessarily inexact. That said, a
survey of rape laws shows that many states expressly define rape as requiring
force,73 while others define rape as sex without consent but then include force
as a component of non-consent.74 The Model Penal Code falls in the former
category, though this may be changing: for the first time in five decades, the
American Law Institute is engaging in a multi-year process of reforming the
Model Penal Code provisions on rape.75 For now, however, the Model Penal
Code reflects the fact that, across a majority of states and in various guises, the
force requirement endures,76 meaning that sex without consent is not itself
rape.
71 See John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni, “No” Still Means “Yes”: The Failure of the “Non-Consent”
Reform Movement in American Rape and Sexual Assault Law, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1081, 1084–86
(2011).
72 See Patricia J. Falk, Not Logic, But Experience: Drawing on Lessons from the Real World in Thinking
About the Riddle of Rape-by-Fraud, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 353, 357 (2013) (“[T]he once-unitary common law
crime of rape, with its heavy reliance on force, has given way to a vast array of criminal statutes differing in
coverage and degrees of severity. Rape has transcended its constrictive, one-dimensional roots to become an
umbrella for a large number of diverse offenses.”).
73 For states that include force in their statutory offense definition, see ALA. CODE § 13A-6-61 (2006);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-103 (West 2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 53a-70 (West 2012); D.C. CODE § 22-3002 (2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.011(3) (West 2015); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-6-1 (West 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-730 (West 2008); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1.20 (2012);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-4-1 (West 2012); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709.1 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN § 21-5503
(West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 510.040 (West 2006); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:42.1 (2007); ME. REV. STAT.
tit. 17-a, § 253 (2006); MD. CODE ANN. CRIM. LAW. § 3-303 (West Supp. 2014); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265,
§ 22 (LexisNexis 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520b (Supp. 2015); MO. ANN. STAT. § 566.030 (West Supp.
2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-11 (West Supp. 2014); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.35 (McKinney 2009); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2 (2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02 (LexisNexis 2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21,
§ 1114 (Supp. 2013); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.375 (West 2015); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 3121
(West Supp. 2014); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-37-2 (West 2014); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-652 (Supp. 2014);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-1 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-61 (West Supp. 2013); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9A.44.040 (West 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8B-3 (West Supp. 2014); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225 (West
Supp. 2014); WYO. STAT. ANN § 6-2-302 (2007).
74 For states with consent definitions that include force, see ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.41.410 (West
2007); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.41.470(8) (West 2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406 (West 2014);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1401(5) (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 773 (West 2010); DEL. CODE.
ANN. tit. 11, § 761 (West 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-502 (West 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-501(1)
(West 2009).
75 See Project to Revise MPC Article 213 on Sexual Offenses Begins, 35 ALI REP., no. 4, Summer 2012,
at 1; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213 (1962).
76 This is despite decades of scholarly criticism, most of it aimed at a redefinition of rape as sex without
consent. Indeed, “[v]irtually all modern rape scholars want to modify or abolish the force requirement as an
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This Part identifies three categories of cases that place this exclusion in
stark relief by depicting the circumstances under which force and non-consent
diverge. These cases involve sleep,77 intoxication,78 and relational control.79 As
this taxonomy makes evident, nonconsensual intercourse can be accomplished
without “force”—a term that, for purposes of rape law, generally means more
force than that inherent in the act of intercourse.80 Where nonconsensual sex
without force is accomplished, the dominant statutory approach classifies such
intercourse as not rape.
Isolating these cases for analysis yields new perspectives on why,
practically speaking, the rape definition matters. As a survey of the case law
shows, these are instances where a statutory force requirement is often difficult
or impossible to satisfy (despite the absence of consent).81 To the extent this
result is normatively unsound, it suggests the need for a more inclusive
definitional approach.
Examination of the no-force/no-consent cases exposes not only statutory
shortcomings, but also underlying judicial attitudes toward consent. In these
cases, consent is typically not an issue on appeal, either because it is not an
element of rape or because the force requirement is by far the more difficult to
establish.82 Still, the case law reflects a telling judicial inclination to posit,
needlessly, the presence of consent—and to do so under unlikely
circumstances. In dicta, judges manifest deep skepticism of non-consent in the
absence of force.83 The effect is a legal presumption of perpetual consent.
element of rape.” David P. Bryden, Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317, 322 (2000). Historically,
resistance to this type of reform has been deeply entrenched. Still today, though deviations from the paradigm
of stranger rape are not expressly invoked to justify the persistence of force as a defining feature of rape,
application of the force requirement reveals an abiding concern for over-criminalizing sex between
acquaintances and intimates. See Victoria Nourse, The “Normal” Successes and Failures of Feminism and the
Criminal Law, 75 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 951, 959 (2000) (“[C]ourts applying the stranger-rape-as-paradigm rule
do not say that rape only happens outside voluntary relationships; they say that they are defining force.”).
77 See infra Part II.A.
78 See infra Part II.B.
79 See infra Part II.C. The cases were selected from various jurisdictions to illustrate recurring problems
in the judicial treatment of consent.
80 See, e.g., State v. Jones, 299 P.3d 219, 228 (Idaho 2013) (defining “extrinsic force” as “anything
beyond that which is inherent or incidental to the sexual act itself”).
81 To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that courts are always correct to reverse based on the
insufficiency of evidence of force. But it is important to emphasize that these reversals are typically predicated
on the need to give independent meaning to a statutory force element. At times, reversal is virtually dictated by
this need.
82 See supra note 71 (describing statutory framework).
83 The preoccupation with force (and resistance) is a longstanding feature of the common law that
persists. See, e.g., Meredith J. Duncan, Sex Crimes and Sexual Miscues: The Need for a Clearer Line Between
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Related to this presumption is a recurring implication that, absent force,
nonconsensual sex itself is not violative.84 Because these understandings are
entirely untethered from a formalized definition of consent, which most
criminal statutes lack, they are insulated from review. The unbounded quality
of these judgments is striking—especially since, as we will discern, judicial
conceptions of consent are antithetical to the affirmative standards sweeping
college campuses and, more generally, incompatible with contemporary norms
around sex.
A. Sleep
The first category of functional force involves sleeping victims. In these
cases, there is no real dispute about non-consent: the victim could not consent
to the penetration while sleeping and did not consent to it at any point prior.
Yet—unlike in the campus sexual assault setting—non-consent does not define
the crime of rape. Instead, the issue of consent almost disappears. What takes
its place is an inquiry into whether there is evidence of force sufficient to
sustain a rape conviction.85 In general, courts find that there is not. Under a
definition of rape as forcible nonconsensual intercourse, sex with a sleeping
victim does not qualify.
1. State v. Elias86
The victim, unnamed in the Idaho appeals court opinion, met Jess Elias
through her neighbor, and the two occasionally spent time with friends in the

Forcible Rape and Nonconsensual Sex, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1087, 1103 (2007) (“Proof that the victim
resisted, therefore, is helpful in at least three respects—proving the victim’s nonconsent, proving the
defendant’s threat or use of force, and proving the defendant’s culpability.”).
84 If the harm of rape were indeed contingent on the use or threatened use of physical violence, as the
common law tradition would have it, the force requirement might be justified. In the latest incarnation of this
argument, Jed Rubenfeld posits that rape implicates a right of physical self-possession, which means that force
sufficient to “dispossess” a woman of her body is required for sex to be rape. Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of
Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372, 1426 (2013). As Rubenfeld
characterizes it, this understanding of rape provides “a legal and theoretical framework in which the force
requirement finds its proper place and explanation.” Id. at 1434 (“[T]he right of self-possession offer[s] rape
law what it has always lacked.”). For reasons that will become apparent, I disagree. See infra notes 248–61
and accompanying text; see also Deborah Tuerkheimer, Sex Without Consent, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335
(2013).
85 Many states separately criminalize sex with a physically helpless victim. In the cases discussed in this
part, however, the defendant was charged with forcible rape.
86 No. 39139, 2013 WL 3480737, at *6–7 (Idaho Ct. App. July 12, 2013).
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backyard of the triplex where she lived. Elias and the victim were never
physically or romantically involved.87
The court described the incident:
On the night of the crime, Elias entered the victim’s home and then
her bedroom where she was sleeping with her two small children
lying next to her. The victim slept in only a t-shirt and awoke around
3:30 a.m. because Elias had his fingers inside of her vagina. She
rolled over onto her side and felt a razor-cut-like burning in her
vagina. Her rolling over had caused Elias’s hand to move. . . . Elias
asked if the victim wanted him to leave. She said she did, and after
Elias left her bedroom, she immediately called both a friend and the
police to report what had just occurred.88

After a medical examination of the victim found evidence consistent with
her account, Elias was arrested and charged with burglary and forced
penetration by use of a foreign object.89
Elias did not challenge the evidence of non-consent.90 Rather, the question
raised on appeal was “whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain Elias’s
conviction through proof that the act was accomplished against the victim’s
will by the use of force.”91 To decide the issue, the court applied the force
requirement found in the state’s rape statute as interpreted by the Idaho
Supreme Court.92 According to the court, “As with the forcible rape statute,
[the forcible penetration statute] requires both an act that is against the will of
the victim and the use of force; therefore, the force inherent in the penetration
itself cannot be sufficient to uphold a conviction.”93 Given this standard, the
state argued that the totality of circumstances suggested that Elias used the
requisite force: he entered a locked home; he necessarily moved the victim’s
legs in order to penetrate her; he caused her to experience pain when he did
so.94

87

Id. at *1.
Id.
89 Elias did not challenge the burglary conviction. Id.
90 As the court noted, “Elias does not contest that the act was against the will of the victim.” Id. at *3.
91 Id.
92 “[A] defendant is guilty of forcible rape if he accomplishes penetration of the victim where ‘she resists
but her resistance is overcome by force or violence.’” Id. at *4 (citing IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6101(4) (West
2011)).
93 Id.
94 Id. at *6.
88
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Rejecting this perspective on force, the court concluded that “even
accepting the State’s version of the evidence, the surrounding circumstances
here do not constitute force within the meaning of [the statute].”95 Elias did not
have a weapon;96 he did not threaten the victim;97 and he did not “act
violently.”98 While Elias’s conduct was “deplorable and blameworthy,”99 it
was not sexual assault. The defendant’s conviction was vacated.100
What is important to see about this case is that the facts allowed the court
(and prosecutor and jury before it) to bypass familiar concerns about lying
victims and misguided defendants. Here, nonconsensual penetration was
undoubtedly accomplished; just not by force. Instead, Elias used the victim’s
“vulnerability,” as the court put it101—the vulnerability that sleep imposes—to
achieve penetration against her will. Laying bare the function served by force
as a defining feature of rape, the court struggled to articulate the harm suffered
by the victim. According to the court, this was “an unconsented to and initially
unperceived violation of her body while she slept.”102 But what the victim
endured was apparently neither a violation of her self, nor a cognizable wrong
of sexual assault.
2. People v. Tenorio103
T.Q. was nineteen years old and the president of his youth group, the
Mangilao Youth Crime Watch. Andrew Tenorio was the group’s advisor.104
On the night of the group’s sleepover at the community recreation center, T.Q.
awoke to find Tenorio’s hand “in his pants touching his penis.”105 According to
the evidence,
Tenorio moved his hand under T.Q.’s boxers, pulled down his pants,
touched his penis until erect, and performed oral sex for about a

95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *7 (emphasis added).
No. CRA07-002, 2007 WL 4689038 (Guam Dec. 18, 2007).
Id. at *1.
Id.
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minute. T.Q. then turned over on his side. After T.Q. turned over,
Tenorio pulled up T.Q.’s pants and T.Q. went back to sleep.106

Tenorio was charged with multiple sexual offenses for the incident
involving T.Q.107 The most serious crime of criminal sexual conduct in the
third degree (“CSC III”) required that sexual penetration be accomplished by
force or coercion.108 Citing language from the Michigan Supreme Court, the
Supreme Court of the Territory of Guam explained that “the force must be
greater than what is inherently required to accomplish penetration and must be
sufficient to allow the defendant to control the victim.”109 More specifically,
the requisite force
does not encompass nonviolent physical interaction in a mechanical
sense that is merely incidental to an act of sexual penetration. Rather,
the prohibited ‘force’ encompasses the use of force against a victim
to either induce the victim to submit to sexual penetration or to seize
control of the victim in a manner to facilitate the accomplishment of
sexual penetration without regard to the victim’s wishes.110

The government argued that Tenorio applied force to T.Q. “by pulling
down the front of his pants and putting his penis in his mouth.”111 This
reasoning was unpersuasive to the court, which held simply that “the statute
and the better reasoned cases indicate that the force applied by Tenorio was not
sufficient.”112 Because the record did not support a finding of physical force to
accomplish the sexual act—however nonconsensual—the conviction for CSC
III was reversed.113
Because the statute prohibited the use of “force or coercion” to accomplish
sex, the court’s ruling focused on the evidence of force, rather than nonconsent.114 But in a separate portion of the opinion, the court revealed its
106

Id.
Id. Tenorio was also charged with committing sexual offenses against two minors involved in the
youth group. Id.
108 In a separate discussion, the court found the evidence of coercion insufficient to sustain the conviction.
Id. at *3–11.
109 Id. at *11.
110 Id. (citing People v. Carlson, 644 N.W.2d 704, 709 (Mich. 2002)).
111 Id.
112 Id. at *12.
113 The court affirmed Tenorio’s conviction on the less serious charge of criminal sexual conduct in the
fourth degree, requiring that the victim be “physically helpless.” Id. at *12–13.
114 Id. at *8.
107

[E]ven though affirmative non-consent is not required in Guam and in a number of other states,
the force or coercion requirement may be interpreted in the context of replacing the non-consent
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doubts about whether the sleeping T.Q. was in fact an unwilling participant in
the sex—or, more to the point, whether Tenorio should have realized that T.Q.
was not consenting. As the court maintained, “Here, T.Q. never indicated to
Tenorio his lack of consent to receive oral sex.”115 Since the statute at issue
was “designed to deter non-consensual sexual penetration,”116 the court offered
this bit of advice: “In most instances, the best first step in avoiding nonconsensual relations is presumably for the non-consenting party to indicate a
lack of consent.”117
In this manner, a formally-abolished resistance requirement found outlet;
the court was admittedly “wary of applying criminal sexual conduct statutes
where the complainant never expressed a lack of consent.”118 Even where T.Q.
was asleep, he was expected somehow to communicate that he did not want his
penis to be touched. Absurd though this may seem, it suggests a number of
possibilities, which I have already suggested resonate in rape law.119 One is
deep judicial skepticism of claims of non-consent absent force. Another is an
assumption of perpetual consent (absent an expressed indication otherwise)
and a willingness to excuse mistakes made in reliance on this assumption. Last
is the denial of injury that attends sex without consent. In Tenorio’s case, the
court implied that there was no harm in the defendant’s conduct even if the
sleeping boy did not consent to the sex.
3. Commonwealth v. Thompson120
Reginald Thompson began molesting his daughter, Marie Moses, when she
was twelve years old.121 One night, the girl “was sleeping and awoke to find
defendant on top of her and his penis moving in and out of her vagina.
Defendant told Marie that she looked like her mom, and that he would not hurt
her. Marie immediately attempted to rise, but could not because defendant’s
legs were over her legs.”122 Thompson was subsequently charged with rape.123
requirement. In other words, the force or coercion should be strong enough to demonstrate that
the complainant did not consent.
Id.

115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id.
Id. at *9.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
2 Pa. D. & C. 4th 632 (C.P. Phila. Cty. 1989).
Id. at 633.
Id. at 634.
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On appeal, he argued that the evidence could not sustain a finding of
forcible compulsion.124 The Pennsylvania appeals court agreed.125 Marie “was
asleep when penetration occurred,” and after she awoke, the “defendant
immediately disengaged.”126 There was “no evidence that defendant grabbed
her, pushed her down, struck her, threatened her, or exerted any physical force
to continue copulating.”127 Marie’s “inability to get up immediately was
merely the result of the force of gravity. . . . and was not that ‘force’
contemplated under the statute.”128
Like other courts construing forcible rape statutes, the court also rejected
the argument that the force required to effect penetration could constitute
sufficient force.129 If the legislature wished to define rape as nonconsensual
intercourse it could do so;130 otherwise, an additional force element must be
afforded independent meaning.
Consent was not an issue in the case, in part because of the statutory
language defining the offense. Interestingly, the court did nonetheless
reference the nonconsensual nature of the intercourse, but only once—to
observe that Marie pushed Thompson away from her when she awoke to find
him inside her. “Her pushing defendant manifested her unwillingness,” stated
the court, “and it was acknowledged by defendant when he removed his penis
and arose at once.”131 The suggestion that Marie’s “unwillingness” to engage
in intercourse with her father was “manifested” merely by her physical
resistance is unsettling.132 On this view, before Marie pushed Thompson—

123

Id. at 633.
The court posed the question presented: was evidence of force sufficient “where the victim was asleep
at the time of penetration and the defendant ceased the intercourse and disengaged when the victim awoke?”
Id. at 635. The court was quick to note that Thompson was not prosecuted for violating the section of the rape
statute covering an “unconscious victim,” which was clearly a mistake on the part of the Commonwealth. Id.
However, the fact that Thompson could have been convicted of a crime other than forcible rape—including, as
he was in this case, “corrupting the morals of a minor” and “indecent assault”—does not change the analysis of
how forcible rape definitions map onto situations involving functional force. Id. at 635–36.
125 Id. at 636 (“[T]he evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for rape by ‘forcible
compulsion.’”).
126 Id.
127 Id. at 652.
128 Id. at 653.
129 Id.
130 See id. at 646, 648–51.
131 Id.
132 This did not lead to a finding of force because Marie “actually succeeded in pushing defendant from
her.” Id.
124
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while she was sleeping, that is—there may have been reason to believe that she
was a willing participant.
Even where the twelve-year-old girl was asleep at the time her father
penetrated her, the court fixed on the lack of provision of a certain kind of
notice.
4. State v. Wine133
S.D. was seventy-one years old at the time of the incident.134 Her daughter,
Clarinda, was married to Douglas Wine. On the evening in question, S.D. and
her husband were spending the night at the home of Wine and Clarinda. S.D.
fell asleep after reading her grandson a bedtime story.135 She awoke to Wine
kneeling beside the bed, his finger in her vagina.136
Wine was convicted of gross sexual imposition, which prohibits sexual
contact when the offender “compels [the victim] to submit by force or threat of
force.”137 Although a victim is not required by statute to prove physical
resistance,138 the Ohio appeals court found the evidence of force insufficient to
sustain the conviction.139 The court explained:
The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that S.D. was sleeping
and unaware of the sexual contact, and, as soon as she awoke, Wine
withdrew his hands from her body, ending the sexual contact.
Significantly, no sexual contact occurred after S.D. was awake and
aware of the sexual contact.140

Distinguishing its holding from cases where convictions on similar facts
were affirmed, the court emphasized that, unlike the victims in those cases,
“S.D. was asleep during the entire time the sexual contact occurred—S.D.’s
fear and distress occurred after the sexual contact occurred when she realized
what Wine had done.”141
133

2012-Ohio-2837U (Ohio Ct. App.).
Id. ¶ 8.
135 Id. ¶ 9.
136 Id. ¶ 10.
137 Id. ¶ 39 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.05(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2015)).
138 Id. ¶ 41.
139 Id. ¶ 52. The court entered judgment on a lesser-included offense of sexual imposition, which prohibits
the defendant from engaging in offensive sexual contact with someone not his spouse, knowingly or
recklessly. Id. (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.06(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2015)).
140 Id. ¶ 47.
141 Id. ¶ 51.
134
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In this case, the court was quite willing to accept that S.D. did not consent
to Wine’s penetration of her vagina while she slept. But the opinion reflects
considerable agnosticism on the question of harm. Implicit in the court’s
reasoning was that, while S.D. may have been injured in some way, the
violation was different enough from the injury that results from forcible
nonconsensual intercourse to justify the distinction drawn by the statute. The
court’s finding of insufficient force was a way of protecting the legislature’s
prerogative “to treat offenders differently depending on the nature of their
conduct.”142 Per the criminal code, Wine’s conduct was less serious than it
would have been had the victim awakened in time to necessitate his use of
force.
B. Intoxication
Like sleep, intoxication can increase one’s vulnerability to rape without
force. In this scenario, nonconsensual sex is achieved by virtue of a victim’s
impaired state—no force is necessary. These cases recur with alarming
frequency in the college setting,143 though of course in others as well.
To be clear, as a conceptual matter, this category of cases does not include
so-called “intoxicated consent” cases.144 Rather, in this category, the victim did
not consent to the conduct, but the defendant nevertheless proceeded; the
victim’s intoxication simply obviated the defendant’s need to use force to
accomplish sex without her consent.
Where the defendant administered the intoxicant, the cases are generally
conceived as rape. The notion of “constructive force” is readily applied to
situations where a victim is drugged, for instance by her date.145 And this
scenario presents no real possibility of mistaken consent.146

142

Id. ¶ 50.
In a major study of rape on campus, researchers found that 7.8% of women were sexually assaulted
after voluntarily consuming drugs, alcohol, or both, to the point of incapacitation, as compared to 4.7% of
women who were victims of physically forced sexual assault. See CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., THE CAMPUS
SEXUAL ASSAULT (CSA) STUDY: FINAL REPORT vii (Dec. 2007), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/
221153.pdf.
144 See Christine Chambers Goodman, Protecting the Party Girl: A New Approach for Evaluating
Intoxicated Consent, 2009 BYU L. REV. 57, 58.
145 Patricia J. Falk, Rape by Drugs: A Statutory Overview and Proposals for Reform, 44 ARIZ. L. REV.
131, 135 (2002).
146 Id. at 136 (“No ambiguity exists about the victim’s consent to intercourse when the defendant has
deprived her of the ability to give consent by administering an intoxicating agent.”).
143
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More often, however, the victim’s intoxication is voluntary. Here, as in the
sleep context, a legal force requirement is problematic. In response, most
jurisdictions have separately criminalized nonconsensual sex with a person
incapable of giving consent due to intoxication.147 However, this statutory
scheme raises its own set of dilemmas, as evinced by the case law surrounding
it. As in the sleep context—and, for that matter, in cases involving minors—
nonconsensual sex with extremely intoxicated victims can be punished in
many jurisdictions under separate statutory provisions. Even so, analyzing the
legal treatment of this recurring fact pattern, which severs force from nonconsent, provides insights into modern rape law’s conceptual underpinnings.148
For present purposes, what is most striking is how an inquiry into consent
is once again subsumed—this time, not by discussions of force, but by fixating
on the level of intoxication. While a victim’s impairment may well help to
explain how nonconsensual sex is achieved in these cases, the definition of
incapacitating intoxication as an independently-significant legal category is
peculiar. Underlying this framing of incapacity, I suspect, is an
unacknowledged preoccupation with mistakes about consent. These cases
reveal a judicial conception of consent as inherently ambiguous.
1. State v. Jones149
E.B. celebrated her twenty-first birthday with a friend. The two women
began the night at a bar, where E.B. consumed eight to ten beers and at least
three shots of alcohol, and then moved to another bar, where they met up with
E.B.’s friend’s boyfriend, Chance, and his friend, Christopher Jones.150 The
group drank more before heading to Chance’s house, where E.B. consumed
three or four more beers.151 Later, E.B. and Jones fell asleep in the living
room—E.B. on the couch and Jones on an ottoman nearby.152
As a court would later describe,
E.B. testified that although she went to sleep on the couch, she woke
up on the floor with Jones on top of her, orally and digitally
penetrating her. After physically resisting and verbally refusing, E.B.
succeeded in getting Jones off of her. Because of the amount of
147
148
149
150
151
152

Id. at 136–37.
See supra note 124 (making a similar observation in the context of a sleeping minor).
804 N.W.2d 409 (S.D. 2011).
Id. at 410.
Id.
Id. Like many cases in the intoxication category, this one also involved sleep. Id.
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alcohol she drank, E.B. testified she went back to sleep on a nearby
chair instead of leaving. E.B. awoke a second time on the couch, with
Jones behind her, with her pants and underwear at her knees and
Jones penetrating her from behind. E.B. testified she yelled at Jones,
pulled her clothes back on, and retreated to the bathroom until Jones
left.153

The following day, E.B. went to the hospital and reported the rape. Jones
was later charged, but not under the section of the rape statute requiring
force—presumably because Jones was able to accomplish intercourse with
E.B. without using the kind of force recognized by law. Instead, Jones was
prosecuted under a provision that prohibits intercourse with a victim
“incapable of giving consent” due to intoxication.154 He was convicted.
The question for the Supreme Court of South Dakota on appeal was
whether the jury was properly instructed on the prosecution’s burden of proof
with regard to the victim’s intoxication level.155 To resolve the issue, the court
was called upon to interpret the statutory language defining rape as “an act of
sexual penetration accomplished . . . [i]f the victim is incapable of giving
consent because of any intoxicating agent, narcotic, or anesthetic agent or
hypnosis.”156 Jones argued that he could not be convicted of rape without proof
that he knew E.B. was incapable of giving consent because of intoxication.157
According to the state, the absence of a knowledge requirement in the statute
meant that Jones could be convicted upon proof that E.B. was incapable of
giving consent, without regard to what Jones knew about her level of
intoxication per se.158
The court reversed the conviction, adding yet another layer of complexity
to the prosecution of nonconsensual sex with an intoxicated victim.159 Going
forward, the state “must prove the defendant knew or reasonably should have
known that the complainant’s intoxicated condition rendered her incapable of

153

Id.
Id. at 411; see infra note 163.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 412 (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-22-1(4) (2006)).
157 Id. at 411.
158 Id. at 411–12. The court conceded that “[t]his language places no apparent requirement on the State to
prove that the accused knew or reasonably should have known the victim was too intoxicated to consent”; yet
the court was unwilling to impose what it viewed as a form of strict liability. Id. at 412.
159 Id. The decision drew a dissent, which charged the court with “impos[ing] its own opinion over that of
the Legislature.” Id. at 414–15 (Gilbertson, J., dissenting).
154
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consenting.”160 Animating the decision was concern for the “innocent state of
mind” possessed by a man who “reasonably and in good faith believed he had
engaged in consensual adult sex” with a woman who “later establishes that she
drank too much to have given her consent.”161 Though entirely inapt as applied
to the facts of Jones, this possibility does suggest fault lines in a statutory
regime that makes incapacity the governing standard. The idea that incapacity
would be established after the fact is troubling, perhaps not for the reason
suggested by the court, but because it elides an inquiry that should be central:
did the alleged victim in fact consent?162
Observe that whether E.B. actually consented is obscured by the dominant
legal construct of incapacity to consent. Unless a victim is fully impaired,163
there is no redress for the harm of unwilled sex—however nonconsensual in
fact. A legal regime sympathetic to confusion about whether a victim was so
thoroughly impaired by alcohol or drugs as to be incapable of consent164
manifests a faulty conception of consent. It is difficult to imagine
circumstances less conducive to misinterpretation than, as in this case, a
woman lying on the floor in a drunken slumber, “physically resisting and
verbally refusing” advances when she awakes before returning to her drunken
slumber.165 Yet the legislature criminalizes the sex forced on her (albeit
without enough force to count) only if she is drunk enough to be legally
incapable of consenting. And a court worries that the man who pulled down
her pants and penetrated her from behind might have made a justifiable
mistake.166

160

Id. at 414 (majority opinion).
Id.
162 A separate question is whether, if she did not consent, he nonetheless believed that she did, and
believed so reasonably.
163 Short of unconsciousness (which might be a byproduct of extreme intoxication, but is not its
equivalent), a level of impairment so extreme that one is incapable of consenting to intercourse seems
unlikely.
164 “[W]here is the line drawn between conscious intoxication and incapacitating intoxication?” wondered
the court. Id. at 414. In the court’s estimation, since “the State relied on an expert witness to help the jury
understand how intoxicated the victim was,” the defendant could not have been expected to realize that she
was incapable of consenting. Id.
165 Id. at 410.
166 See id. at 414 (“For rape by intoxication . . . where is the line drawn between conscious intoxication
and incapacitating intoxication? In this case, the State relied on an expert witness to help the jury understand
how intoxicated the victim was. Yet the very fact that the State needed an expert makes the idea of strict
liability for this offense even more problematic.”).
161
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2. Commonwealth v. Urban167
Martin Urban and his victim, unnamed in the opinion, were both affiliated
with the Harvard School of Dental Medicine, she as a dental student and he as
a postdoctoral resident.168 For a while, the two lived in the same dormitory,
and Urban was an occasional supervisor of the victim’s clinical work.169 On
repeated occasions, Urban expressed romantic interest in the victim, which she
did not reciprocate.170
On the night in question, the two attended the same party at a local bar.
Over the course of the evening, the victim—who would later testify that she
“get[s] drunk easily”—drank a beer and up to seven shots of alcohol, three or
four of them purchased for her by Urban.171 Eventually, the “highly
intoxicated” victim ended up at Urban’s apartment, along with eight or so
friends, where she fell asleep on the couch.172 Later in the night, when it was
time to go home, the victim was helped out to Urban’s car, where she again
drifted into sleep.173
Urban first drove home the victim’s friend, who indicated that a mutual
friend would be waiting at the dorm to assist the victim to her room. The
victim heard this but then went back to sleep.174
The court described what followed:
[T]he next thing she remembered was that the car was parked and the
defendant was kissing her, which awakened her. The complainant
was “in shock,” scared, and confused. The defendant pulled her head
toward his penis and placed it in her mouth; she tried to pull back and
fell back against the seat. The defendant then vaginally raped her and
said to her, “You don’t know how long I’ve been waiting for this.”
The complainant testified that during these events she was “really
drunk,” had no energy, felt physically paralyzed, said nothing
because she was scared, could not move, and was unable to push him
off.

167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

880 N.E.2d 753 (Mass. 2008).
Id. at 755.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 755–56.
Id. at 756.
Id.
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The defendant put the complainant’s clothes back on and helped
her to the front seat, explaining that he did not want [her friend] “to
be suspicious.”175

The next day, a medical examination of the victim found a genital tear
“caused by blunt force trauma that was consistent with sexual assault.”176
Urban was subsequently convicted of rape.177
His appeal challenged the jury instructions on non-consent, particularly
regarding the evidence needed to establish that the victim lacked the capacity
to consent.178 To suffice, according to the Supreme Judicial Court, the level of
intoxication must be extreme: the prosecution must demonstrate that “the
complainant was so impaired as to be incapable of consenting to
intercourse.”179 Because the trial court’s charge “failed to clarify that an
extreme degree of intoxication is required before the incapacity rule will
apply,” Urban’s conviction was reversed.180
The facts of the case underscore the workings of intoxication as functional
force. Here the victim’s level of impairment—regardless of whether it rose to
the level where she was “incapable” of consenting—made her an easy target
for Urban, in large part because he could achieve nonconsensual intercourse
without resorting to physical force.
The case also illuminates a curious feature of rape law: utter passivity on
the part of a victim is equated with consent to intercourse.181 This presumption
is afforded particular strength where there is scant evidence of physical force.
So instead of asking whether the victim consented to the intercourse—which is
a more straightforward inquiry—the law contorts the question. The jury must
decide whether she was incapable of consenting. Anything less is too
ambiguous to find legal outlet. So while extreme intoxication may, like
unconsciousness, “vitiate[] consent,”182 one wonders: what if (as seems the
case here) there was no consent to vitiate?

175

Id.
Id. at 756–57.
177 Id. at 754.
178 Id. at 757. The definition of force in Massachusetts is fairly expansive, which might explain Urban’s
failure to appeal the sufficiency of evidence on this element.
179 Id. at 758.
180 Id. at 758–59.
181 See Tuerkheimer, supra note 25, at 1496–502 (discussing the “Passive Woman” in rape law).
182 Urban, 880 N.E.2d at 758.
176
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Once again, we can discern the legal sidestepping of sex without consent.
C. Relational Control
The last category of functional force includes cases where the victim’s
ongoing relationship with the defendant obviates the need for force to
accomplish nonconsensual sex. What I term “relational control” encompasses
two (sometimes interrelated) dynamics: fear and trust.
1. Fear
Rape law has long contemplated the relevance of a victim’s fear of her
assailant. When the law still formally required that a woman resist her attacker,
her failure to do so was considered acceptable if she was reasonably in fear.183
Likewise today, a threat of force sufficient to place a reasonable person in fear
often satisfies the force requirement.184
A difficulty for rape law lies in assessing the reasonableness of fear where,
as is common, a victim’s response to the defendant’s conduct is rooted in the
context of their relationship. Unlike the woman who confronts a knife-wielding
stranger, the woman whose fear stems from past interactions with her wouldbe rapist confronts a hostile legal landscape. Interpreting the force requirement,
courts have conceptualized fear as “general fear” where its origins can be
traced to conduct on the part of the defendant that preceded the incident in
question.185 “General fear” is not the kind of fear that turns nonconsensual
intercourse into rape.186
This narrow temporal frame does not correspond to the phenomenology of
fear. From the perspective of the person experiencing it, fear of the
defendant—whether based on his behavior just moments beforehand or years
earlier—is fear of the defendant; either way, its presence can render
unnecessary the use of force to achieve nonconsensual intercourse.
183

See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 574, 577 (6th ed. 2012).
Id.
185 See, e.g., State v. Alston, 312 S.E.2d 470, 476 (N.C. 1984).
186 The case of Alston, which appears in most criminal law casebooks, raises just this issue. Alston, 312
S.E.2d 470. Reversing a rape conviction based on insufficient force, the North Carolina Supreme Court
specifically dismissed the relevance of the defendant’s prior abuse of the victim. Id. at 476. As the court
emphasized, “Although [the victim’s] general fear of the defendant may have been justified by his conduct on
prior occasions, absent evidence that the defendant used force or threats to overcome the will of the victim to
resist the sexual intercourse alleged to have been rape, such general fear was not sufficient to show that the
defendant used the force required to support a conviction of rape.” Id.
184
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Rape law’s non-recognition of general fear as functional force has clear
implications for domestic violence victims.187 But relational control manifests
itself in other, less obvious, ways that are also overlooked by the legal
privileging of just-instilled fear. A prime example of this dynamic is the
treatment of fear stemming from past childhood sexual abuse by the defendant.
a. State v. Magel188
When the victim was young, her mother went to prison, and she and her
sister were sent to live with their father, Jack Magel, and his wife.189
Magel had sex with the victim when she was nine years old.190 While she
held her legs together and said “no,” Magel “would just open them up.”191
When the victim told him that she “didn’t want to do it,” he responded that
“everything would be okay.”192 He also told her “not to tell because if [she] did
something would happen to [her] sister” and that “he would hurt [her]
sister.”193
The victim returned to live with her mother a few years later.194 One day
during the summer that the victim was twelve years old, she and Magel wound
up picking cherries at a farm near his mobile home.195 According to the
evidence,
At defendant’s invitation, the victim accompanied him inside the
mobile home. Defendant went into his bedroom and then called for
the victim to come in. When she did, she found him naked. She told
him that she “didn’t want to do it,” and he responded by telling her
that “everything was going to be okay.” Defendant told the victim
that she “could get on the bed[,]” and she did so. Defendant then had

187 In abusive relationships, physical violence and sexual violence often coexist. See Jacquelyn C.
Campbell, Health Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence, 359 LANCET 1331, 1332 (Apr. 13, 2002)
(discussing a meta-analysis in which researchers found that 40–45% of battered women also experienced
sexual violence).
188 268 P.3d 666 (Or. Ct. App. 2011).
189 Id. at 667.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 667–68.
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sexual intercourse with her. She did not “put up a fight” because she
believed that if she tried to do so, “he would just fight right back.”196

The victim waited a year to disclose the incident because, as she explained,
her sister still lived with Magel’s ex-wife and because Magel knew where she
(the victim) lived and “could still get to [her].”197
Magel was later convicted of first-degree rape.198 Under the applicable
statute, forcible compulsion included “a threat, express or implied, that placed
the victim in fear of immediate or future death or physical injury to self or
another person[.]”199 Because the state did not allege that Magel used physical
force, the issue presented on appeal was whether the defendant “engaged in
conduct that . . . constituted an implied threat.”200 Even accounting for “the
surrounding circumstances,”201 as required by precedent, the appellate court
held that the evidence in this case could not sustain a finding of forcible
compulsion.202 Magel’s conviction for rape in the first degree was reversed.203
The court’s reasoning exemplifies decontextualized legal analysis:
Although it is not disputed that the victim actually believed that
defendant would physically force her to engage in sexual contact . . .
nothing in the record suggests that defendant engaged in any force on
the day of the picnic other than the force inherent in the sexual
conduct at issue. Furthermore, there was a significant lapse in time
since the prior incidents; the victim no longer lived with the
defendant nor was he in a parental position in her life; defendant had
divorced his wife and moved from the home where the victim’s sister
lived; and defendant’s conduct and statements to the victim on the
day of the [incident] itself were not threatening in nature. In the end,
the state presented no evidence of an implied threat by defendant at
the time of the sexual conduct at issue and, therefore, no evidence of
forcible compulsion.204

196

Id. at 668.
Id.
198 Id. Magel was also convicted of rape in the second degree and sexual abuse based on conduct
occurring on other occasions. Id.
199 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting OR. REV. STAT § 163.375 (2009)).
200 Id. at 669.
201 Id. at 671 (“[A] threat that is sufficient to compel a person to submit to sexual contact will vary
depending on the surrounding circumstances, including the parties’ respective ages and the history and
relationship between them.”).
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 671 (emphasis added).
197

TUERKHEIMER GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

9/21/2015 11:49 AM

RAPE ON AND OFF CAMPUS

33

Note the court’s expressed awareness that, based on her experience of
having been forcibly raped by him in the past, the victim was indeed compelled
to engage in intercourse with her father—who was, rather inconceivably,
described as not occupying a “parental position in her life.”205 The court
subsequently reiterated that “the prior incidents, though remote in time,
influenced the victim’s expectations of defendant and, indeed, compelled her
to submit.”206 But even so, “that influence does not qualify as an implied threat
in the legal sense and, therefore, does not constitute forcible compulsion.”207
The legal meaning of implied threat, then, ignores the influence of
relationships in which violent control has been exercised over time. This
narrow reading tends to reinforce the force requirement as a manifestly
physical construct. To the extent it matters at all, consent is relegated to the
periphery of concerns.
2. Trust
Trust is perhaps the most difficult variant of functional force to isolate
because it tends to overlap with sleep or intoxication. In many (though
certainly not all) of the cases that fall into these two categories, the victim
relied on the goodness of a man who would become her rapist.
Even so, trust is important in its own right. In the context of non-stranger
rape, trust imposes vulnerability.208 This vulnerability often substitutes for
force, enabling sex without consent.209 Stripped of alcohol, sleep, and longtime
fear, the pure trust cases highlight an independent mechanism of control.

205 Id.; cf. State v. Schaim, 600 N.E.2d 661, 663–64 (Ohio 1992) (finding insufficient evidence of force in
a case alleging that the defendant raped his twenty-year-old daughter, a victim of childhood incest whose “will
to resist [was] overcome by a prolonged pattern of abuse” by her father).
206 Magel, 268 P.3d at 671.
207 Id.
208 Linda Fairstein, former chief of the Manhattan District Attorney’s Sex Crimes Unit, has observed,

[M]ost sexual assaults occur when there is a combination of two critical conditions: opportunity
and vulnerability. The rapist needs the opportunity to commit the crime, and he succeeds when a
victim is vulnerable at the moment of his opportunity. . . . She was vulnerable precisely because
she did know her assailant; she was vulnerable because she trusted him. And we rarely speak
with a survivor attacked by a co-worker, date, friend, or relative who doesn’t tell us that the
reason they were together (and usually together alone) was because she knew and trusted him.
LINDA A. FAIRSTEIN, SEXUAL VIOLENCE: OUR WAR AGAINST RAPE 132–33 (1993).
209 Research into the sexual assault of young women found that more than half the cases occurred when
the perpetrator “just did it before you had a chance to protest.” Laurel Crown & Linda J. Roberts, Against
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a. People v. Carlson210
The victim was a tenth grader at the high school that Eric Carlson
attended.211 The two had known one another for a few years at the time of the
incident. One day after school, Carlson called the victim and asked if she
wanted to “hang out.”212 She agreed and the two drove in Carlson’s car to the
parking lot of a YMCA.213 According to the court’s description of the
evidence,
The complainant allowed the defendant to unbutton her blue jeans
and to digitally penetrate her. The complainant testified, “He started
making out again, the same stuff[214], and then wanted to have sex
with me and I said no. He asked me why. I just said because I don’t
want to.” After an interval, the defendant repeated his request that
they have sexual intercourse. The complainant again said “no,”
explaining that she “didn’t want to.” “He [next] asked me if he could
just stick [it] in once and I said no.” He essentially repeated the
question several times, and she would not answer him “[bec]ause I
didn’t want to answer him any more.” She acknowledged that she did
not physically restrain or push him away and then said, “He stuck it
in anyways and kept moving and asked me if I was enjoying it and I
said I didn’t want to do it.” When asked how he got it in, she said,
“He got on top of me and put it in.”215

Carlson was later charged with criminal sexual conduct in the third degree,
which prohibits the use of force or coercion to accomplish penetration. At the
preliminary hearing, his lawyer did not challenge the sufficiency of evidence
on non-consent.216 The girl had, after all, said no to intercourse repeatedly and
unequivocally. Yet Carlson was able to achieve sex without her consent, and
without using force, because she trusted Carlson to respect her expressed
desires. She did not expect that this boy from her high school might get “on top
of [her] and put it in.”217 Consequently, Carlson was able to do just that.218
Their Will: Young Women’s Nonagentic Sexual Experiences, 24 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 385, 392
(2007).
210 644 N.W.2d 704 (Mich. 2002) (per curiam).
211 Id. at 705. Although the case had not been tried, the facts were developed from the complainant’s
testimony at a preliminary hearing and treated by the court as true for the purpose of analysis. Id. at 705 n.2.
212 Id. at 705.
213 Id.
214 On an occasion two weeks prior, Carlson and the complainant drove to a different parking lot, where
“consensually he digitally penetrated her and she manually masturbated him.” Id.
215 Id. (alterations in original) (footnote added).
216 Id.
217 Id.
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While not contesting non-consent, the defense argued that evidence of
force or coercion was lacking.219 Calling this “your classic example of date
rape,” the prosecutor responded that the victim “was not a willing partner at
this time and that’s all the force that is necessary.”220 Carlson “wanted what he
wanted,” added the prosecutor, “and he took it from her without her permission
when she said no.”221
The trial court found insufficient evidence that Carlson used physical force
or coercion to overcome the victim.222 An intermediate appeals court affirmed,
stressing that “[b]oth parties were apparently in such a state of undress from
their admittedly mutually agreeable sexual activity”—another reflection of the
complainant’s trust in Carlson, though the court did not perceive this—“that no
further undressing was necessary. The Defendant then got on top of her and
inserted his penis into her vagina.”223
The appeals court also sounded a cautionary note:
There is no evidence that Defendant forced Complainant’s legs apart
or placed her body in a position to receive him. This may have
happened but there is no evidence of it in the record leaving only
speculation for the Court to draw such a conclusion. The inference
from the record is just as probable that in addition to no longer
answering Defendant’s questions about engaging in sex she also
cooperated by placing her body in a position to receive Defendant
just as she had cooperated in the prior sexual activity.224

We should observe that this reasoning is in tension with the function of an
appellate court; when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, inferences are
to be drawn in favor of the prosecution.225 But the court seemed intent on
articulating its own perspective on the underlying facts. In particular, doubts
218

It bears mention that rape is especially prevalent among teenagers. According to the latest research,
over 40% of female rape victims are first raped before the age of eighteen. MICHELE C. BLACK ET AL., NAT’L
CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL
INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 25 (2011) [hereinafter,
NISVS], http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_report2010-a.pdf.
219 Carlson, 644 N.W.2d at 705.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 705–06.
223 Id.
224 Id. (emphasis added).
225 In general, questions of fact are to be resolved in favor of the prosecution when a court is deciding
whether the evidence is sufficient to proceed, and, subsequently, whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a
conviction. See 5 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 627, Westlaw (database updated May 2015).
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about force entailed doubts about non-consent; the absence of physical force
indeed became a proxy for consent.
The court’s expression in this regard was quite unnecessary—again, the
statute did not contain a consent element. Faced only with the question of
whether evidence of force was sufficient, the court was nevertheless moved to
emphasize its disbelief that sex was accomplished against the complainant’s
will. As is often the case, the court reached beyond the statutory definition to
address consent, then to presume its presence.226
b. State v. Rodriguez227
Alexander Rodriguez, a 24-year-old man, met Dilillo, age nineteen, at a
religious retreat, after which the two “exchanged e-mail addresses and
promised to stay in touch.”228 They exchanged emails almost daily, discussing
“their respective religious callings and past personal relationships,” and
Rodriguez invited Dilillo to attend an all-night adoration at St. John’s
Cathedral.229
Instead, the two wound up sitting on a couch in the enclosed front porch of
Dilillo’s home.230 A court would later describe what transpired: “Rodriguez
asked to kiss Dilillo and she consented. The two kissed for a while and . . . at

226 The Michigan Supreme Court ultimately vacated the appellate court’s opinion and remanded the case
for reconsideration in light of the proper standard of force, which it defined as follows:

To be sure, the “force” contemplated in [the statute] does not mean “force” as a matter of
mere physics, i.e., the physical interaction that would be inherent in any act of sexual penetration,
nor, as we have observed, does it follow that the force must be so great as to overcome the
complainant. It must be force to allow the accomplishment of sexual penetration when absent that
force the penetration would not have occurred. In other words, the requisite “force” . . . does not
encompass nonviolent physical interaction in a mechanical sense that is merely incidental to an act
of sexual penetration. Rather, the prohibited “force” encompasses the use of force against a victim
to either induce the victim to submit to sexual penetration or to seize control of the victim in a
manner to facilitate the accomplishment of sexual penetration without regard to the victim’s
wishes.
Id. at 709. On remand, the trial court again found that there was insufficient force to proceed and dismissed the
case. Email from Deborah Tuerkheimer to Ryan Pulley (June 30, 2015, 2:55 PM) (on file with author)
(memorializing a conversation with Prosecutor Gregory Babbitt of Ottawa County Office of Prosecuting
Attorney on March 27, 2014, in which Gregory Babbitt relayed information about the trial court’s dismissal of
the case, without a written order, after finding insufficient force).
227 2003-Ohio-7056U (Ohio Ct. App.).
228 Id. ¶ 9.
229 Id.
230 Id. ¶ 11.
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some point Rodriguez inserted his finger into her vagina.”231 Dilillo would
later testify that she was “shocked.”232
A jury convicted Rodriguez of rape, defined under the Ohio statute as
“sexual conduct with another when the offender purposely compels the other
person to submit by force or threat of force.”233 On appeal, Rodriguez argued
that the evidence of force was insufficient to sustain his conviction.234
The law does not generally recognize rape by surprise. Noting that the
element of force can be “inferred from the circumstances surrounding the
sexual conduct,” the appeals court emphasized that, to establish the element,
the victim’s non-consent must be overcome by fear or duress.235 Put
differently, the proper inquiry is not whether the victim’s will was overcome,
full stop, but whether her will was overcome by fear or duress.
Given the applicable statutory framework, the court might have reversed
the conviction based on the reasonable conclusion that no force was used to
overcome Dilillo’s will. The court could well have surmised that, by virtue of
her trust, the use of force was unnecessary. But the court’s reversal rested on
quite a different line of reasoning.
After explaining that Rodriguez never threatened Dilillo or used force, the
court went on to advance its view of the relevance of Dilillo’s behavior to this
determination. As the court explained, “At no time did Dilillo indicate that
Rodriguez forced her.”236 Even more emphatically, “Everything in this record
suggest [sic] consensual behavior between two adults.”237
Note that this judgment evinced a particular understanding of consent—one
that is, outside of the law, highly contested. We might wonder what exactly
Dilillo did to show that she consented to Rodriguez inserting his finger in her

231

Id.
Id. Later that same night, the two were kissing when Rodriguez again “inserted his finger into her
vagina.” Id. ¶ 13. Dilillo “protested immediately, but Rodriguez ignored her and kept his finger inserted for
almost ten minutes.” Id. She “told him to stop,” but he did not until she tried pushing him off. Id.
233 Id. ¶¶ 19, 22 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.02(A)(2) (LexisNexis 2002)).
234 Id. ¶ 20. Digital penetration satisfied the state’s definition of “sexual conduct.” Id. ¶ 22. Rodriguez was
also convicted of “gross sexual imposition,” which likewise requires force or the threat of force but defines
sexual contact more narrowly, to include touching any erogenous zone of another for the purpose of sexual
gratification. Id.
235 Id. ¶ 23.
236 Id. ¶ 28.
237 Id. ¶ 23 (emphasis added).
232
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vagina.238 (Recall that prior to this, the two had only kissed.239) But we should
also attend to the extralegal nature of the court’s judgment in this regard.
Again, the statute outlawed sexual submission by force or threat of force,
failing altogether to center consent, much less define it. This failure enabled
resort to unfettered judicial preconceptions about the significance of passivity.
The court’s formulation of consent is unsettling, at best. If its interpretation
of the events at issue reflected idiosyncratic views, they could be more readily
dismissed. But throughout rape law, the affirmative features of consent are
profoundly misunderstood. This misunderstanding can persist because
considerations of consent are subsumed by the requirement of force.

238 To be sure, this case is a difficult one; many prosecutors would choose not to pursue it. But the victim
was sufficiently credible for a jury to convict the defendant. Given that the jury convicted, the appeals court
was also supposed to credit the victim’s testimony. See supra note 225.
Consider that non-stranger rape cases often feature just the sort of ambiguities presented here:
consensual conduct of some sort (albeit only kissing in this case) that precedes the unconsented-to act; perhaps
even consensual conduct of some sort subsequent to it. There may well be a delayed reaction to the experience
of violation. See infra note 239.
239 For the court, what happened afterwards made this encounter seem consensual:

We are reminded that Dilillo [later] consented to giving Rodriguez a ‘hand job.’
Furthermore, after Dilillo realized Rodriguez had not left, but was sitting in his car in her
driveway, she voluntarily went out, entered the car, accepted chewing gum, resumed kissing, fell
asleep, and did not re-enter her house until 2:30 a.m. the next morning. Dilillo spent
approximately three hours in the car with Rodriguez.
Rodriguez, 2003-Ohio-7056, ¶¶ 23–24. Concerned that Rodriguez had drugged her, Dilillo went to the hospital
the next day. Id. ¶ 13.
The court’s inability to fathom why Dilillo might spend time with Rodriguez in the immediate
aftermath of nonconsensual intercourse reflects a failure to consider the context of their relationship. The trust
that enabled him to accomplish sex without her consent would not necessarily evaporate at the moment of her
violation. Empirical research on “confidence rape” helps to explain this response. In one study, victims were
“significantly slower in seeking medical attention or rape crisis intervention in comparison to their blitz
counterparts.” Sally I. Bowie et al., Blitz Rape and Confidence Rape: Implications for Clinical Intervention, 44
AM. J. PSYCHOTHERAPY 180, 185 (Apr. 1990). Researchers posited that this delay was perhaps “related to
heightened feelings of shame and/or an unrealistic sense of responsibility and guilt.” Id. Researchers further
hypothesized that “[b]ecause of their familiarity with the assailant, some confidence rape victims, e.g., ‘date
rape’ victims, are unclear that the attack or forced sexual encounter to which they were subjected constitutes
rape.” Id.
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III. RAPE WITHOUT FORCE, ON AND OFF CAMPUS
Society is in the midst of a consent revolution. This shift is especially
salient on college campuses, where a perceived crisis has triggered emphatic
responses from policymakers and university administrators.240 These responses
have certainly encountered challenges. As we are now seeing, operationalizing
the concept of consent—especially in affirmative formulations—can be a
difficult task.241 Even more formidable is the difficulty of constructing
adequate procedures for investigating and adjudicating sexual assault
allegations.242 But overall, a basic idea has taken hold: sex without consent is
rape.
Within the law, quite the opposite is true. As we have observed, rape
statutes position consent as far less central than other operative constructs, or
as not relevant whatsoever.243 The contrasting treatment of unconsented-to sex
suggests a deepening divergence: on campus, this is rape; off campus, it often
is not.
This divergence portends a number of troubling prospects. One is the
classification of rape as a sub-criminal offense for the population of college
women who survive it. While in theory criminal justice remedies can be
pursued simultaneously with a college disciplinary proceeding or subsequent to
it, aggressive measures to handle an allegation administratively may well be in
tension with criminal prosecution.244 For those who experience it on campus,
rape may constitute, in effect, a quasi-crime.245

240

See supra notes 38–55 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
242 See Bartholet et al., supra note 17 (expressing the objections of members of Harvard’s law faculty to
various aspects of the university’s new sexual assault policy, including its inconsistency with principles of
“due process of law . . . and the rule of law generally”).
243 See supra notes 71–81 and accompanying text.
244 The coordination of multi-system responses to rape allegations is complicated and appropriately the
subject of independent consideration. Here it suffices to note that the odds of a successful criminal justice
investigation and prosecution will often diminish where a campus proceeding has already been initiated. See
Eliza Gray, Why Victims of Rape in College Don’t Report to the Police, TIME (June 23, 2014), http://time.com/
2905637/campus-rape-assault-prosecution/ (explaining that law enforcement officers find it “difficult . . . to
pursue criminal action when they don’t collect evidence from the victim early in the process”).
245 As a practical reality, such may be the current status of non-stranger rape. See Lonsway &
Archambault, supra note 6 (documenting a “justice gap” for sexual assault cases); infra note 268. Still, to
calcify this treatment by way of formalizing disparate criminal offense definitions reflects movement in the
wrong direction. See infra note 270.
241
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For victims whose sexual assault did not occur in the college setting, the
only resort is to the criminal justice system. Where the statutory force
requirement endures, sex without consent does not count as rape; campus rape
reform is meaningless. Those subject to the less inclusive definition may find
their core injuries unrecognized by the law.246
Further, the yawning gap between rape law and widespread sexual norms
undermines the legitimacy of the criminal law itself. Unless and until the law
evolves, it risks obsolescence in the realm of non-stranger rape. This
progression may well require a new theoretical foundation.
As I have written:
Modern rape law is undertheorized. Over time, its original
justifications have eroded. In their place, certain propositions have
become generally (if not universally) accepted: women are sexual
beings; their chastity no longer needs protecting. All this time,
however, rape has persisted. Indeed, we now know that the danger is
less a stranger in an alley than a husband, co-worker, date, or hookup. In response to profound shifts in the way we understand both rape
and female sexuality, the law of rape has become unstable. It badly
needs reconstructing. Yet the old rationales cannot tell us why rape
ought to be specially criminalized in the present day (or how).247

To this end, I stake a conceptual claim: rape law should protect sexual
agency.248 The idea of agency grounds a theory of rape; it also helps to explain
the emergence of a culture of consent. Given the significance of these dual
functions, the meaning of agency warrants discussion.
A. Theorizing Sexual Agency
Sexual agency entails recognition that the self is socially constructed in a
“context of intersecting power inequalities,”249 a context featuring gender as a
246 For many rape victims, the experience of violation derives from the fact that sex was imposed without
consent. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 25, at 1475–78.
247 Tuerkheimer, supra note 84, at 335.
248 This turn from the more traditional autonomy norm is rooted in feminist attention to subordination and
its consequences for women in particular. See Kathryn Abrams, From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist
Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805, 805 (1999) (describing how “the liberal norm of
autonomy has been modified—or . . . ‘reconstructed’—by its encounters with contemporary feminist theory”).
As for the relationship between autonomy and agency, Kathryn Abrams has noted, “It remains an open
question whether the feminist influences I describe will, in fact, ‘reconstruct’ liberal autonomy, or transform it
into something else altogether.” Id.
249 Id. at 806.
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primary locus of subordination.250 Unlike the traditional autonomous self, who
can operate largely free of external influences, the agentic subject experiences
substantial constraints. Yet within these constraints, the agentic subject is
capable of exerting a will. This phenomenon is essential both to selfdefinition251 and to self-direction.252
This insight reflects a positive understanding of sex—sex not only as
pleasure, but also as resistance to subordination.253 On this view, female
sexuality has the potential to defy repronormative ideologies that linger still
today.254 Sexual subjectivity may even prove fundamental to achieving a more
egalitarian social structure.255
Without denying the existence of constraints,256 a theory of sexual agency
posits that agentic beings are nevertheless capable of consent. Indeed, agency
makes consent the pivot point for distinguishing rape from sex. As I have
250

Id. at 821.
“Self-definition” involves “determining how one conceives of oneself in terms of the goals one wants
to achieve and the kind of person, with particular values and attributes, one considers oneself to be.” Id. at 824.
252 “Self-direction” includes “the identification of particular goals and the implementation of particular
projects and lifeplans.” Id. at 829.
253 Sex-positive feminists have conceived sex as “a potentially important site of pleasure, fulfillment, and
even power.” Rosalind Dixon, Feminist Disagreement (Comparatively) Recast, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 277,
282 (2008) (citations omitted).
254 See id. (“A key source of injustice, for sex-positive feminists, is the way in which women’s sexual
agency is limited by prevailing ideologies, particularly ‘repronormative’ ideologies, i.e., those that valorize
reproduction over other socially productive activities and cast[] non-reproductive sex for women as dangerous
and illegitimate.” (citation omitted)).
255 Admittedly, profound tensions inhere in the concept of sexual agency. See Tuerkheimer, supra note
25, at 1478 (noting that “core tensions inhere in the concept of agency that threaten to undermine it,” and
identifying the dilemmas of objectification, sexualization, and decontexualization). A range of coercive
practices—even short of rape—influence women’s sexual choices, meaning that sexuality cannot be abstracted
from social hierarchies. As Robin West persuasively argues, some sex is neither rape nor cause for celebration.
In particular, West has developed the “possibility that the sexual choices women make, when those choices are
contrary to felt desires, are harmful.” West, supra note 56, at 246. Consensual sex that is unwanted and
unwelcome “often carries harms to the personhood, autonomy, integrity, and identity of the person who
consents to it . . . .” Id. at 224.
256 The existence of structural constraints means that sexual agency is imperfect. As I have summarized
this conception:
251

It contemplates rampant sexual violence by non-strangers and strangers alike, along with a
culture that excuses this violence and conditions rape protection on sexual conformity. It
acknowledges that women and girls consent to sex for reasons other than desire, and it resists the
unthinking exaltation of this kind of sex. It recognizes that female sexuality is constructed along
multiple axes, and that the path to liberation has as many forks. It is complicated, both contingent
and tentative. And it is partial, positioning sexual agency not as everything, but as essential.
Tuerkheimer, supra note 25, at 1494.
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previously argued,257 living as a subject means that one can consent to sex—
for whatever the reason, without judgment. Consensual sexual expressions bear
tremendous equalizing potential, including the possibility to “‘disrupt
dominant sexual discourses,’258 to assert power within a relationship, to contest
imposed definitions of one’s self, and to forge new definitions.”259 To consent
to sex is indeed to assert agency—especially for those whose sexuality has,
over time, been variously denigrated, co-opted, denied, stigmatized,
mythologized, and punished.
Likewise, for women to not consent to sex is to assert agency. Not
consenting to sex manifests an insistence that one’s decision not to have sex
matters—that it is not subordinate to any other’s. If sex is done to a woman
irrespective of this decision, her agency has been quintessentially violated. Put
differently, if sex without consent is simply sex (and not rape), a nonconsenting woman is more akin to object than subject. As compared to the
actor who imposed his will upon her, she is relatively powerless.
Regardless of the quantum of force employed, sex without consent is rape
because disregarding consent vanquishes agency. Indeed, sex against one’s
will is sexual agency’s antithesis. Consent qua consent thus becomes a matter
of paramount importance. In short, distinguishing sex and rape by consent’s
presence or absence affords meaning both to a woman’s consent and to her
non-consent, affirming her existence as a sexual subject.
With agency as a guiding principle, the law’s adherence to a force
requirement is highly problematic. If rape is a violation of sexual agency, sex
with a (non-consenting) sleeping woman is akin to sex with an object, not a
subject; the woman is acted upon. In much the same way, a non-consenting
woman, because of intoxication or fear or trust, can be forced absent physical
force to have sex. Since sex obtained without consent for whatever reason is
sex without agency, it is rape. The harm of rape is best described in relation to
the promise, and the imperfection, of agency.
Similarly, sexual agency explains the cultural ascendance of consent and
provides impetus for reforming its legal definition. Statutory language that
describes consent as “words or overt actions . . . indicating freely given

257
258
259

Tuerkheimer, supra note 84.
Abrams, supra note 248, at 839.
Tuerkheimer, supra note 84, at 342; see also supra notes 251–52 and accompanying text.
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agreement”260 contemplates the interaction of sexual subjects; not objects. On
this view, women and men are deemed capable of having and of expressing an
intention to engage in sexual conduct. Without somehow expressing this intent,
one cannot be said to have acted as a subject.261
Affirmative consent definitions—like the campus disciplinary codes that
have become commonplace262—construct sexuality to underscore its agentic
qualities. By doing so, these definitions have the greatest potential to promote
agency.
CONCLUSION
The decisive advance of consent culture positions rape law at a liminal
moment. Having repudiated its patriarchal foundations,263 but not completely,
the law of rape risks obsolescence absent further reform.264
Much of what remains contested in rape law265 can be explained by a
failure on the part of reform efforts to fully dislodge the stranger-rape
paradigm.266 Despite the fact that the vast majority of victims know their
260

See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 257–59 and accompanying text.
262 See supra notes 41–51 and accompanying text.
263 Marking the area already traversed, a number of antiquated doctrinal tenets have been disavowed. Now
the rape of wives by husbands is formally outlawed. The law recognizes that men, too, can be raped. Victims
must no longer resist in order to avail themselves of legal protections, and unique evidentiary and procedural
requirements have been formally abolished. These developments qualify as real successes.
264 It has been almost two decades since Stephen Schulhofer described a “myth of reform” in his
influential book on rape law. STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND
THE FAILURE OF LAW 1 (1998) (“Despite three decades of intensive public discussion and numerous statutory
reforms, the problem of rape has not been ‘solved.’”); see also Nourse, supra note 76, at 954 (characterizing
the “myth of reform”).
265 Notwithstanding the general prohibition, women’s sexual histories may still be allowed in evidence if
judges deem these behaviors deviant, or outside the normal bounds of female sexuality. See Tuerkheimer,
supra note 7. More proof that rape law’s evolution is incomplete is the ongoing doctrinal presence of
resistance as a means of defining force, or even consent. See Michelle J. Anderson, Reviving Resistance in
Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 953. As Victoria Nourse has astutely observed in this very context, “Outdated
norms resurface but remain undisclosed in newer, more ambiguous guises.” Nourse, supra note 76, at 959.
266 Susan Estrich once described this paradigm:
261

A stranger puts a gun to the head of his victim, threatens to kill her or beats her, and then engages
in intercourse. In that case, the law—judges, statutes, prosecutors and all—generally
acknowledge that a serious crime has been committed. But most cases deviate in one or many
respects from this clear picture, making interpretation far more complex. Where less force is used
or no other physical injury is inflicted, where threats are inarticulate, where the two know each
other, where the setting is not an alley but a bedroom, where the initial contact was not a
kidnapping but a date, where the woman says no but does not fight, the understanding is
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rapist,267 the elements of the offense of rape have traditionally been premised
on exactly the opposite scenario.268
Most notably, reform efforts have left intact a bizarre patchwork of laws
requiring the use of force for nonconsensual intercourse to qualify as rape.
Nested in the dominant statutory approach are a set of related assumptions:
without force, a woman cannot be compelled to engage in sex; the harm of
rape is defined by force; an absence of consent matters only insofar as force is
employed to overcome it. Consistent with a stranger-rape paradigm, if not
wholly derived from it, these assumptions relegate the giving of consent to a
place of little or no concern.
Within these parameters, appellate courts are still finding ways to opine on
consent—mostly to emphasize its likely presence notwithstanding utter
passivity on the part of the victim (and a jury finding to the contrary). Yet
judicial conceptions of consent are unconstrained by definitional boundaries;
the criminal law remains remarkably undeveloped in this regard.
My analysis has isolated the phenomenon of rape without force, both to
show that it exists and to critique its legal treatment. This examination has
exposed a body of law shot through with retrograde notions of female
different. In such cases, the law, as reflected in the opinions of the courts, the interpretation, if
not the words, of the statutes, and the decisions of those within the criminal justice system, often
tell us that no crime has taken place and that fault, if any is to be recognized, belongs with the
woman.
Susan Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1092 (1986).
267 Of women victimized by rape, half are raped by an intimate partner, and 40% by an acquaintance.
NISVS, supra note 218, at 17–18.
268 David Bryden has described the criminal justice system’s bifurcated treatment of rape as follows:
Whatever their other disputes, rape-law scholars agree about several fundamental realities. They
agree that, for practical purposes, forcible rape is really two crimes. The consensus is that the
criminal justice system performs at least reasonably well in dealing with “aggravated” rapes,
defined as rapes by strangers, or men with weapons, or where the victim suffers ulterior injuries.
With equal unanimity, scholars agree that the justice system often has performed poorly in cases
involving rapes by unarmed acquaintances (dates, lovers, neighbors, co-workers, employers, and
so on) and in which the victim suffers no additional injuries. Victims are less likely to report
these acquaintance rapes (or even to recognize that they are rapes); if a victim does report it, the
police are less likely to believe her; prosecutors are less likely to file charges; juries are less
likely to convict; and any decision by an appellate court is more likely to be controversial.
Bryden, supra note 76, at 317–18 (footnotes omitted); see also Estrich, supra note 266, at 1161 (“The
available data suggest that while violent, stranger rape may be among the most frequently reported crimes in
this country, the non-traditional rape—the case involving non-strangers, less force, no beatings, no weapons—
may be among the least frequently reported, even when its victims perceive it to be ‘rape.’ In many if not most
of these cases, forced sex is tolerated by its victims as unavoidable, if not ‘normal.’”).
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sexuality. So too is rape law entirely disconnected from an emerging culture of
consent—a culture that is evidenced by the movement surrounding campus
rape.
The insight that sex without consent is rape is true regardless of whether
the non-consenting party is a college student: across educational status, rape
ought to be properly defined.269 Statutory reform in this direction would
resolve many of the doctrinal tensions embedded in the cases.270 It would focus
attention on the meaning of consent. It would conform to widespread norms
surrounding sex. And it would bring into alignment the definitional treatment
of rape on and off campus.
For now, archaic understandings of female sexuality saturate the criminal
law. Until this changes, the consent revolution will remain incomplete.

269 See supra note 20 and accompanying text (describing recent empirical evidence that non-college
women are more vulnerable to sexual assault than their college counterparts).
270 This solution is of course partial. In particular, it does not address either the problem of underenforcement or the difficulties involved in proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt—concerns that tend to
arise in non-stranger rape cases. See supra note 268. These are important issues that merit separate attention.
In my view, neither enforcement nor evidentiary challenges should be conflated with the threshold definitional
question that has been the focus of this discussion. Likewise, the appropriate structure of penalties—both
direct and collateral—warrants independent consideration.

